

# EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY OF THE UN POLICE DIVISION

31 MAY 2016





# Acknowledgments

The independent review team to undertake the functional review of the United Nations Police Division was appointed by the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations in January 2016. The review was prompted by the Secretary-General's Report entitled *The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* (para 93 of A/70/357–S/2015/682). The review team has been co-chaired by former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Hilde F. Johnson and Ambassador Abdallah Wafy, the Permanent Representative of Niger to the United Nations in New York, and former Police Commissioner and subsequently Deputy SRSG with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Other members of the review team include Mark Kroeker (United States), former United Nations Police Adviser, former United Nations Police Commissioner and most recently Deputy SRSG ad interim with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Janine Rauch (South Africa), Additional Inspector General of Police Benazir Ahmed (Bangladesh) and Dr Serge Rumin (Switzerland).

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# Figures, Text Boxes, Annexes and Credits

## *Figures*

Figure 1: Growing Complexity of United Nations Police Tasks

Figure 2: Nature of United Nations Police Required for Peace Operations

Figure 3: Fast-Track Selection Process for United Nations Police Officers in Field Missions

## *Text Boxes*

Box 1: UNPOL civilian police experts in Timor-Leste

Box 2: Planning for international deployments – a military tasking, a new police skill

Box 3: Recurrent recruitment gaps in MINUSTAH

Box 4: UNMISS: Use of specialized teams from Rwanda and Uganda

Box 5: Decentralization of the recruitment process in UNMIL

Box 6: Reinforcing Current Field Missions – a core Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and Police Division task

Box 7: For policy to change behaviour it needs to be constantly reinforced and requires a dedicated team to oversee its implementation

Box 8: European Union – United Nations cooperation could be much further developed and in particular along four lines

## *Annexes*

Annex 1: United Nations Police Roles in Reform, Restructuring and Development

Annex 2: 349 Days Average Time for Headquarters Recruitment

Annex 3: Preliminary Police Division Structure

Annex 4: Preliminary Staffing Implications

## *Front Cover Photo Credit*

Peacekeeping Service Medal parade for military and police officers at UN DPKO HQ, New York. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe.

# Contents

■ Executive Summary and Key Recommendations	VI
■ Acronyms	X
■ I. Introduction	1
■ II. Methodology	3
■ III. Current Context of Peace Operations	5
■ IV. The Current Operating Model	7
■ V. Responsibilities of Police Division	10
■ VI. Towards a new Operating Model for United Nations Police	12
■ VII. Functions of Police Division	16
■ Function 1, Leadership	16
■ Function 2, Planning	19
■ Function 3, Recruitment	20
■ Function 4, Knowledge	27
■ Function 5, Accountability	30
■ Function 6, Partnerships	32
■ VIII. Structure and Resourcing	36
■ IX. Implementation	41
■ Annexes	45

# Executive Summary and Key Recommendations

## *Introduction*

This review is both timely and necessary, following as it does in the footsteps of the first United Nations Security Council Resolution 2185 on policing in United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions, the High Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (HIPPO) report, and the Global Study on Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The review took a field-focused approach to its terms of reference, concentrating initially on the needs of host-States of United Nations peace operations, and subsequently their police components. On that basis, the review team then explored the required responsibilities and functions of the Police Division and its needed capacities.

## ***United Nations Policing Mandates and the current United Nations Police (UNPOL) operating model***

The nature of United Nations peace operations has evolved significantly over the past two decades. This trend was well captured in the 2000 Brahimi and the 2015 HIPPO reports. Activities have become increasingly wide-ranging and complex, moving from monitoring host-State police to supporting the reform and restructuring of police services and related institutions. In a few exceptional cases (such as Kosovo and Timor-Leste), ‘executive’ police mandates involved substituting for inadequate or absent police and law enforcement capacity. More commonly, mandates have emphasized the protection of civilians, in most cases combined with requirements to build host-State police capacity. These tasks are complicated by weak governance, fragile and politicized institutions, community dislocation, and a highly complex operating environment.

United Nations Police (UNPOL) have increasingly become a central pillar of United Nations peace operations, based on the recognition that it is the breakdown of law and order that is often the trigger for United Nations engagement. Equally, it is the establishment of the core functions of the police and minimum capacity within the criminal justice chain that provides a basis for the United Nations to reduce and eventually withdraw its peace operation.

While this was clearly acknowledged in Security Council Resolution 2185, the change in approach that this demanded has not been fully implemented. Police Division and UNPOL have made a lot of effort in recent years, to adapt their recruitment system, policy and approach to make them more responsive and relevant to the needs of the field, Member States and the United Nations system. However, as this report shows, Police Division and UNPOL processes remain overly influenced by a military culture of peacekeeping, and significant gaps still remain. While UNPOL should not be a development agency, it should take a development approach to the reform and restructuring component of its mandate, if it is to be effective. In addition, police components in the field have expressed deep concerns about the lack of field orientation of headquarters. In reality, Police Division’s current capacity and resourcing is insufficient and has not kept pace with the increased tasks and complexity of police mandates in peace operations.

The current UNPOL operating model is based on a series of assumptions which directly limit the ability of both Police Division and police components within missions to fulfil their mandate. The current model does not differentiate between the two key aspects of the mandate given to UNPOL – that being a protection mandate on the one hand and a reform, restructuring and development mandate for police institutions on the other. A paradox also exists between the supply of a large number of regularly rotating personnel, largely composed of generalists, and the medium-term qualitative and structural challenges they are expected to address. There is equally an assumption that a mission can easily adapt to changing needs, can identify and integrate lessons whilst utilizing such an ad-hoc capacity. The truth, as one Head of Police Component put it, is not that police components have been in the mission area of up to 10 years, they have in effect been there for “one year-ten times”.

The current approach has meant that police components have not adapted sufficiently over time to the changing needs of host-States. Equally technical experts are often deployed to post-conflict contexts and expected to automatically become qualified or effective mentors or institution builders. This is compounded by the assumption that behavioural change and systemic reform can be brought about through co-location alone and in the absence of a clear guidance on basic policing.

Finally, to improve, develop or build effective policing in any country requires engagement beyond the police organisation itself. Police reform and restructuring in post-conflict contexts means that the United Nations must be able to engage with a) a much broader scope of actors, including Ministries who manage or oversight bodies that hold police services to account, as well as other actors in the criminal justice chain, b) the political dynamics related to – and within the police organizations, and c) stakeholders and security providers beyond the State. This is a significant undertaking, made more difficult in the absence of a clear and coherent UNPOL policy, meaning that there is no unified approach, nor standards for the development of police organizations.

Developing fully-fledged police and justice institutions is a long-term process. It goes far beyond the life span of a United Nations peace operation. For the United Nations, the ability to support a host-State to develop a functioning police service meeting basic standards is a measure of success. This, and minimum capacity and integrity in the criminal justice system, would be the primary test for the exit of missions.

However, the review team, based on the evidence collected during this process, questions the ability of the current UNPOL operating model to deliver on such objectives and meet the demands from the field, Member States and the United Nations system. Much of the challenge is around the type of capacity available to meet the host-State's needs and how these needs are translated into more tailored mandates. The conclusion drawn in this regard is that Member States and the Security Council are left with a stark choice: either they maintain the status quo and adapt mandates to what police components under the current operating model can realistically achieve (meaning limited capacity building and institutional development) or they change the current operating model to deliver on tailored and achievable mandates, acknowledging the critical role of UNPOL and provide the enhanced capacities that could better meet the needs of today's missions.

## ***Towards a New Operating Model for United Nations Police***

Assuming that the Security Council is likely to continue authorizing complex mandates for police components of peace operations, it is imperative to address the constraints within which the Police Division operates and to change the approach of UNPOL. To make it possible for police components to have a better chance of achieving these results, there is a need for a **paradigm shift** in UNPOL's operating model. The new operating model for Police Division must build on the following key imperatives:

a) ***Police must be at the centre of peace, stability and development:*** Police Division must take its rightful and political place in United Nations' decision making and United Nations headquarters structures. This has consequences for the positioning of the Police Division within DPKO and for Police components in field missions.

b) ***Mandates of Police components must be sequenced and flexible:*** As contexts change, mandates need to adapt, based on an assessment of the current needs, with consequences for the approach, the capacity, and the priorities of the mission. Police components have two key objectives, firstly, to secure the peace through stabilizing the situation and secondly, to ensure stability by building up core functions of the national police. Securing the peace requires higher numbers, while reform, restructuring and institutional development implies a lean, targeted police structure in missions.

c) ***United Nations Police must be field- and results-oriented:*** Police components should be measured on results, which involves both successful protection of communities, and the development of host-State police capability.

d) ***Authority must be decentralized to empower Police components to deliver:*** Implementing a flexible and host-State driven system requires decisions to be made as close to the issues as possible. Systems and functions should be decentralized, including management tools and decision making on human resources.

e) **Recruitment should be results-driven:** The police competencies required to fulfil mandates on providing protection differ from those required for police reform and institutional development. Diversification of competencies through specialized police officers and seconded civilian experts are essential for police institutional development.

f) **A culture of accountability must be developed:** A culture of accountability is needed on multiple levels, at Headquarters and in the field, starting with transparency in terms of recruitment and better reporting to Member States. The CONOPS constitutes the accountability framework between the Heads of Police Components and Headquarters on delivery of the mandate. The Police Adviser should be empowered by the Secretary General and the Security Council to exercise substantive oversight of police components in the field.

g) **There must be coordination and coherence in the approach, between the actors and institutions across the criminal justice chain:** Police reform in isolation cannot succeed, as the police do not exist in isolation from the wider criminal justice system, or those institutions that manage or oversee policing services. Working with partners is critical for results to be achieved in all these areas. Police components are not development agencies but do need to take a development approach and from the outset link up with development actors, such as United Nations Funds, Programmes and bilateral agencies. It is when such complementarity works that handover can be possible and an earlier exit of a mission can be envisaged.

Rather than focusing on high numbers of police officers and meeting the “authorized strength” described in Security Council mandates, the new operating model is based on the fact that the more targeted and tailor-made the UNPOL support to host-State’s needs, and the more coherently the police component works with other actors, the more effective it will be at achieving results. Continued high numbers of Formed Police Units (FPUs) and police protection officers is not a good indicator, neither for the country, nor for the police component, indicating as it does continued instability in the host-State. As the situation stabilizes those engaged in protection should reduce in size, with more opportunity for supporting reform, restructuring and institutional development. It is when there is progress on the development of host-State police capability, through the establishment of basic core police functions that exit of missions can be foreseen.

**To be able to implement the new operating model for the Police Division and UNPOL, this report proposes ten key recommendations:**

## **KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1. The Police Adviser position should be upgraded to an Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) level and be ‘double-hatted’, as an adviser on policing to the United Nations leadership and also as Director of the Police Division** working within OROLSI on policy development and complementarity of the United Nation’s approach across the criminal justice system. There should be a similar ‘double-hatted’ approach taken for Heads of Police Components in the field. The Police Adviser should also be empowered to provide substantive and strategic oversight of United Nations police activities in the field.
- 2. The current staffing level of the Police Division needs to be increased** in order to align proportionally with the expanded role of police in contemporary peace operations.
- 3. Planning peace operations and their police mandates must be based on a thorough political and technical analysis of the context.** The assessment of the context, capacities and needs of host-States will determine the need to address a) the protection needs and b) the institutional development requirements. An empowered Police Division planning capability, coupled with a sequenced approach to mandating of police components, will help in determining the type of capacities required at each phase of the mission to meet the host-State needs. This analysis will not only assess the host-States’ progress and their capacity requirements, but will also consider whether a continued presence of FPUs and Police Protection Officers is needed, and if so – at which level.

4. **UNPOL recruitment should be mandate-based, focused on two streams: protection and development.** The protection stream would include seconded Police Protection Officers and Formed Police Units, while the reform, restructuring and institutional development stream would include Police Development Officers/Teams and Seconded Civilian Experts. These categories would be in addition to the normal Professional posts within police components. Rather than the inverse incentives of deploying high numbers and meeting the so-called “authorized strength” of the mandates, the incentives of such a model would be the opposite. This new deployment- and recruitment model is estimated to provide significant savings, beyond any increase in costs foreseen as a result of the recommendations in this report.
5. **Finalisation and roll out of the Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) should be done urgently.** The SGF process should balance the need for the completion of the higher policy level documents with the dissemination of more applied operational guidance and tools. There should also be a link made to relevant policy and guidance within the CONOPS, to ensure the appropriate policy is used in the right phase of the Mission. The Police Division should be structured and resourced to collect, analyse, disseminate and apply lessons from UNPOL missions. Police Division should facilitate cross-mission networks to share experience and good practice.
6. **A series of concrete recommendations are made to put in place an accountability framework for Police Division and to reinforce the procedural integrity of the recruitment process.** This includes the need to oversee and evaluate Police components’ efforts to achieve the goals set out in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), initiatives to ensure that unethical behaviour by members of police components is appropriately sanctioned. To avoid potential risk of abuse in the recruitment process, Police Division should be proactive and take measures to reinforce the procedural integrity of the process. A package of proposals should be put in place, including decentralizing some recruitment functions to field missions, dividing responsibility for recruitment across the Division, the announcement of all UNPOL positions openly on the UNPOL website and requesting the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships (OPSP) to undertake ad-hoc audits of the recruitment process, the results of which should be made public.
7. **The Standing Police Capacity (SPC) of Police Division should remain in Brindisi, but must be better integrated into the New York-based structures of the Division.** Some additional functions, not essential for New York-operations, should be moved to Brindisi to reinforce a stronger field focus, substantively and operationally, and provide some cost saving measures.
8. **There is a critical need for a comprehensive review of Formed Police Units and their management, both in Police Division and by Police Contributing Countries.** This should include how they are deployed, the impact of their role within missions, the application of the FPU policy in practice, as well as challenges around their flexibility, mobility and options to provide equipment. Police Division needs to be empowered to lead on the enforcement of the FPU policy.
9. **A Police Advisory Committee (PAC) should be created,** to advise and assist the Secretariat on all questions relating to the use of police to maintain international peace and security, the deployment of officers placed at its disposal, and the capacity development role of UNPOL missions. Member States should consider to which United Nations entity this Committee should report.
10. **Given the forthcoming transition in the leadership of the United Nations, the Secretary-General should appoint a senior official to oversee the follow up of this report,** working with Police Division and DPKO leadership. This would include preparing decisions on recommendations within the Secretary-General’s authority and a further reform plan. A reform package, as reflected in this report, should be considered by the new Secretary-General and his/her team.

# Acronyms

ACABQ	United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
AU	African Union
C34	General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CAR	Central African Republic
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
D/SRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Head of UN Peace Operations Mission
DFS	United Nations, Department of Field Support
DPA	United Nations, Department of Political Affairs
DPET	Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training within the Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DPKO	United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GFP	Global Focal Point Arrangement for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
HoPC	Head of Police Component
HRDDP	The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
HRUF	The Human Rights up Front initiative
IOT	Integrated Operational Team
IPO	Individual Police Officers
IT	Information Technology
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MMSS	Mission Management and Support Section, within the Police Division/DPKO
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MoUs	Memorandums of Understanding
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OMA	Office of Military Affairs/DPKO
OO	Office of Operations/DPKO
OPA	Office of the Police Adviser/DPKO
OPSP	Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions/DPKO
PAC	A Police Advisory Committee
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PoC	Protection of Civilians
SAAT	Selection Assistance and Assessment Team
SCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGF	Strategic Guidance Framework (for United Nations police)
SPC	Standing Police Capacity, Police Division/DPKO
SPDS	Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division/DPKO
SRS	Selection and Recruitment Section, Police Division/DPKO
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General, Head of UN Peace Operations Mission

SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USG	United Nations Under Secretary-General

# I. Introduction

1. The Police contribution to United Nations peace operations has come a long way since the first police ‘component’ was deployed to the Congo in 1960. The 1990s saw a significant increase in the number of UNPOL<sup>1</sup> officers deployed and saw the first major expansion in the mandate of police components into institution-building of police in post conflict countries. Numbers reached a peak in 2011 with 17,775 authorised and 14,333 UNPOL officers deployed.

2. In 2000, the Brahimi report called for a “doctrinal shift” in the use of police, following which the Police Division was established, and the term “CIVPOL” was abandoned in favour of “UNPOL”. The Secretary General issued in 2011 the first report on UNPOL, acknowledging UNPOLs central role in the achievement of sustainable peace and security. Three years later, in November 2014, the Security Council passed Resolution 2185 the first ever thematic resolution on United Nations police.

3. Encouraging gender mainstreaming in police components of United Nations peace operations has also come a long way. In 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, affirming the importance of women’s full participation in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security. Since then, the normative framework has substantively expanded, requiring peacekeepers to understand and be able to respond to women and children protection issues<sup>2</sup> and prevent Sexual Exploitation and Abuse<sup>3</sup>. In 2009, the United Nations launched its Global Effort initiative with the objective of increasing the number of women police in peacekeeping to 20%. The first ever all-female Formed Police Unit was deployed from India to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2007. Today, 16% of all IPO’s in DPKO and DPA missions are women, as are 6% of all deployed FPU personnel. In total, that means 9% of all United Nations police officers are women<sup>4</sup>. The 2015 Global Study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325<sup>5</sup> found that many challenges remain in terms of the United Nations reaching its target.

4. As recognised in resolution 2185 and the report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), United Nations Police have a critically important role in peace operations as they are intended to bolster one of the host-State’s core functions through their support to the national police. Establishing the basic functions of police institutions in host-States represents one of the important preconditions for the exit of a United Nations mission.

5. United Nations Police contributions to peace operations have undergone a significant evolution over the last two decades utilizing varying types of engagement, from reinforcing public order, to protection of civilians -- including responding to gender-based violence -- to more targeted advisory roles. In most mission mandates, building police institutional capacity<sup>6</sup> is a priority and essential for longer-term peacebuilding and development efforts in the political, economic and social spheres.

6. Though capacity building has been a core mandated task in every DPKO mission since 2003<sup>7</sup>, Headquarters capacities to support this task have not kept pace. Field capabilities have not adequately adapted to meet mandates focusing on reform, restructuring and development of host-States’ police. The HIPPO report made a clear link between United Nations police support to building host-state capacity and the need to review the roles and responsibilities of the Police Division. It recommended a review of the “organisational structure, staffing and capacity of the Police Division [...] to better meet new approaches to support national police.”<sup>8</sup> The Secretary-General’s implementation report<sup>9</sup> instructed the Police Division to undertake an external review of functions, structure and capacity, the results of which would influence the Secretary-General’s forthcoming report on United Nations policing.

<sup>1</sup> The term UNPOL and United Nations Police are used interchangeably throughout this text.

<sup>2</sup> SCRs 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 1988 (2011), 1960 (2013).

<sup>3</sup> SCRs 1572 (2004), 1807 (2008), 1888 (2009).

<sup>4</sup> Percentages as per Police Division records (March 2016).

<sup>5</sup> UN Women (2015), “Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace”, United Nations.

<sup>6</sup> Consistent with SC Resolution 2185, this report will use both “police institutional development” and “reform, restructuring and development” to refer to the United Nations Police role in developing host-State police partners.

<sup>7</sup> Except for the 2016 UNFICYP mandate and 2015 UNMISS mandate

<sup>8</sup> HIPPO report, §168.

<sup>9</sup> UN document A/70/357-S/2015/682 (2015) p93

7. While the objective of this report is not to review UNPOL in general, this review of the Police Division has taken the needs of host-States and field operations as its point of departure. On this basis, the review examined the Police Division's approach, whether it is adequately configured, staffed and resourced in light of the new demands, evolving mandates and current mission environment. It is informed by the recommendations of previous review processes, including the 2008 Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of the management of United Nations Police operations<sup>10</sup>, and the 2008 Internal Review of the Police Division<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> OIOS Audit Report, 26 August 2008.

<sup>11</sup> Report of the Comprehensive Analysis of the Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2008.

8. The review is intended to provide an independent analysis of the responsibilities, functions, structure and capacity that is crucial for the performance of Police Division. All elements of the current Police Division structure were reviewed, including the Office of the Police Adviser, the New York-based sections for Mission Management and Support, Selection and Recruitment and Strategic Policy and Development, the police liaison officers in the Integrated Operational Teams in the Office of Operations, and the Standing Police Capacity based in Brindisi, Italy.

9. The findings and recommendations contained in this document represent the unanimous position of the review team. The Police Division was given the opportunity to check the facts contained within, and where substantiated the review team updated the content.

# II. Methodology

10. The external review of the functions, structure and capacity of the Police Division used a mixed methods approach for the data collection and evidence gathering process. It focused on ensuring that the identification of issues and proposed options were grounded in validated information and thorough analysis.

11. The first phase of the review included a thorough revision of all relevant United Nations policy, strategy, guidance, and reporting documentation. This included internal and external monitoring and evaluation reports relevant to Police Division as provided by the division, as well as Member States. Numerous papers, reports, and documents were reviewed. The main documents assessed included, Police Division foundational, strategic, and yearly planning documents, the Strategic Guidance Framework, previous reviews of Police Division, budget submissions, reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), Secretary-General reports related to policing, and relevant Security Council Resolutions.

12. Acknowledging that the field's needs and challenges ought to be at the core of how headquarters understands its role, the review based its approach on also understanding host-States' needs and how UNPOL responds. As a result, the team conducted two field visits, one to MINUSCA (Central African Republic) and one to MINUSTAH (Haiti) to directly observe and take note of the challenges in the field and to identify opportunities to be highlighted in the review.

13. To validate the field's results and draw a more holistic picture of UNPOL's needs and gaps, a two-day workshop was organized in Entebbe, Uganda, in April. This was attended by most of Heads of Police Components. In total the review team has benefited from direct interaction with the Police Commissioners and Police Advisers of MONUSCO, UNSOM, UNAMID, UNMISS, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNISFA, MINUSCA and MINUSTAH<sup>12</sup> and two former ones, representing the Kosovo and South Sudan missions. The review team consulted with representatives from the host governments of Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Haiti. As a result, the collected views reflected the concerns of the vast majority of police components in **DPKO-led** and **DPA-led missions**, and a number of host-States.

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<sup>12</sup> See further list of acronyms at the front of this document.

14. At United Nations headquarters, the team has reached out as widely as possible to Member States including separate meetings with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), the Group of Friends of United Nations Police, the Strategic Police Advisers Group, the top Police Contributing Countries, as well as Permanent Members of the Security Council. It had extensive consultations with all relevant parts of the United Nations Secretariat, including DPKO and its different entities (OROLSI, OO, OMA, OPSP, DPET), DPA, DFS, as well as OIOS<sup>13</sup>. Furthermore, the review team has engaged with UN Women, UNDP, members of the Global Focal Point, and others.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

15. The review team dedicated the bulk of its data collection and analysis to Police Division senior management, section chiefs and staff, including a two-day consultation mission to Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in Brindisi. Various meetings and workshops were conducted to capture initial perspectives, validate conclusions and collect good practice. Police Division also contributed to the deliberations of the team through a position paper summarizing its key points and issues. In total over 300 practitioners were consulted in New York, Brindisi and in the field.

16. In terms of partnerships the review team reached out to the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), to assess where collaboration was occurring, and where gaps existed.

17. Last but not least, the review team received 14 written contributions by Members States, as well as nine submissions by civilian policing experts and consulted previous reviews and evaluation reports from a number of missions.

18. Regarding sources for the findings in this report, in the absence of, or availability of, independent and comprehensive monitoring or evaluation reports in a number of areas, our main source and evidence base has been the large number of interviews undertaken with headquarters and field personnel and other stakeholders. For reasons of confidentiality, we have not specified the names and dates of interviewees.

19. The external review of the Police Division was undertaken under conditions that limited the scope of potential consultations, and which were not conducive to pursue further opportunities for evidence collection and validation. The main constraint was time, since the review team had only five months to conduct all the substantive work, from the time of appointment of the expert panel to the delivery of a preliminary draft for fact-checking, editing and revision.

# III. Current Context of Peace Operations

20. While the number of inter-state armed conflicts has declined since the 1990s, the United Nations' role in countries affected by conflict has increased in scale and scope. The traditional United Nations role of monitoring ceasefire agreements and providing a buffer between warring parties is less in demand. Conflicts are increasingly within states, often with no peace agreement to implement, making the path to peace less linear and more complex.

21. Into this context, the United Nations Police have increasingly become a central pillar of United Nations peace operations<sup>14</sup>. In the first place, the breakdown of law and order often triggers United Nations engagement. On the other hand, it is the re-establishment of minimum police and justice services that provides a basis for the United Nations to reduce and eventually withdraw its peace operations.

22. States emerging from conflict face significant challenges. No two countries face exactly the same context. Yet there are certain similarities that can be observed in the security environment and within the police institutions of countries emerging from protracted conflict. In such cases, police often lack capacity, with many officers having had limited access even to the most basic training, making them ill-equipped to police what is inevitably a divided community. Roles and responsibilities of the police often overlap with those of the military. The police as an institution are often politicized by the conflict. The police institution is often centralized, burdened by unreformed bureaucracy, and guided by outdated management practices. There is often little delegation of authority and an overwhelming need for greater standardization of police practices, systems and procedures. Moreover, in some contexts, following the integration of former combatants, the actual number of police officers is unknown and the delineation between those who can exercise police powers and those who cannot remains unclear. It is, in such environments, that the United Nations Police must operate, both to reinforce the provision of security, at times directly, but also to build or re-build a basic system of policing, allowing the host country to fully take on this role and the United Nations to withdraw.

23. Developing effective and accountable policing is not a panacea for post-conflict countries. It is part of a complex response to tackle the root causes of insecurity and prevent conflict. However, public policing is often the most visible sign that things are changing for the better. As gatekeepers to the criminal justice system and the most visible arm of the state, the police can become a litmus test of change, or a sign of the fragility that remains. The police can be a force for peace or a cause of instability. They are critical to creating an environment which fosters political, social and economic development.

24. United Nations engagement often takes place in a contested political and security environment, and, as such, many contemporary United Nations peace operations face significant challenges in navigating the contexts they are required to operate within. The international community has learned hard but valuable lessons over the last two decades on reforming, restructuring, and developing security and justice institutions in post-conflict situations. Many of these lessons led to the development of the concept of security sector reform, the principles of which apply to UNPOL support for police institutional development in Mission environments. These can be summarised as: i) police reform, restructuring and development is a political as much as a technical activity; ii) building effectiveness of police and other security actors without adequate accountability can perpetuate potential abuse by security providers; iii) police institutional development requires a developmental approach to capacity

<sup>14</sup> In line with the HIPPO report, this review will use the term "peace operations" to cover the range of tools managed by the United Nations Secretariat. The instruments range from special envoys and mediators; special political missions; regional preventive diplomacy offices; observation missions; small technical-specialist missions such as electoral support missions; multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations drawing on civilian, military and police personnel to support peace process implementation; as well as advance missions for planning.

**“ United Nations police must operate, both to reinforce the provision of security, at times directly, but also to build or re-build a basic system of policing, allowing the host country to fully take on this role and the United Nations to withdraw. ”**

building, as well as policing skills and knowledge; iv) police institutional development should be harmonised with developments across the criminal justice chain, including with those actors that manage and oversee police activities.

25. These factors all influence the chances of success when the United Nations supports national policing. Political influence on the police, the role of other security elements, oversight institutions such as ministries, parliament, civil society and the media, as well as the criminal justice chain, all have a bearing on the chances of success. A holistic approach to strengthening national police institutions needs to take all these issues into account, and work with and through actors who can influence developments positively. Without such efforts and a coherent approach to Rule of Law by United Nations missions and their partners, United Nations Police cannot succeed in their endeavours.

26. The objective for any United Nations Police component must be to provide support that is tailored to the country's needs, whether in the protection area or in relation to reform, restructuring and developing police institutions, and to work effectively and in a coherent way with all other relevant actors, as listed above. Success is possible only when collective efforts are aligned behind a strong, national commitment to develop effective and transparent judicial and police institutions. The establishment of the core functions of police and a base level of capacity and integrity in the criminal justice system are key.

27. This is the context within which United Nations Police components operate, yet there are underlying assumptions that limit their ability to meet the objectives as set by the Security Council, as well as the needs of host-States. That said, it is unlikely that the demand for peace operations in the near future will be lower than today, and it is likely that complex threats will have an influence on United Nations policing related tasks. Evolving threats and shocks over the last decade have been met by mandates that, in practice, demand a much more robust policing model from United Nations contingents. Almost every United Nations peacekeeping mandate now includes specific provisions on women, peace and security<sup>15</sup>. Greater knowledge and competencies within UNPOL are needed to close the current gap between these commitments and current capabilities<sup>16</sup>.

28. The evolving global security environment requires a response that no single actor can provide (or pay for), bringing to the fore the need to frame United Nations peace operations and build strategic partnerships with other multilateral and regional organisations. There is a strong case for efforts to build the institutional capacity and integrity of organizations to deal with security challenges in their regions: e.g. the African Union or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as to develop United Nations Police in cooperation with other multilateral actors like the AU, EU, INTERPOL or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

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**“ Political influence on the police, the role of other security elements, oversight institutions such as ministries, parliament, civil society and the media, as well as the criminal justice chain, all have a bearing on the chances of success. ”**

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<sup>15</sup> Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice and Securing Peace, UN Women 2015, p144.

<sup>16</sup> Security Council Resolution 2106 recognizes the role of United Nations peacekeeping contingents in preventing sexual violence, and, in this respect, calls for all pre-deployment and in-mission training of troop- and police-contributing country contingents to include training on sexual and gender-based violence, which also takes into account the distinct needs of children.

# IV. The Current Operating Model


29. The ability of both Police Division and police components in the field to fulfil their mandate is limited by the current operating model for United Nations Police. The current model appears largely supply driven and dependant on the capabilities that Police Contributing Countries provide. It is somewhat rigid and based on ad-hoc, relatively short-term deployments to influence structural changes and to build institutional capacity.

30. Police mandates have expanded significantly over the last two decades, to address the medium-term development<sup>17</sup> challenges associated with the reform, restructuring and development of host-State police<sup>18</sup>. This has resulted in United Nations Police having to absorb more and more complex tasks, taking on more sophisticated responsibilities, but without a significant change in approach or the type of resources available. As such, Police Division and UNPOL are struggling to cope, caught in a cycle of having to work within a model which is not fit to meet the needs of the current mandates, and see their performance assessed against unfair and inappropriate expectations.

<sup>17</sup> This report uses the term “development” to refer to the police institutional development required to support minimally functional police services. UNPOL is mandated to address immediate needs, while setting up reforms and restructuring which support the initial development of basic law enforcement structures.,

<sup>18</sup> Security Council Resolution 2185.

Figure 1: Growing Complexity of United Nations Police Tasks



31. The perception from multiple stakeholders is that the Police Division’s current operating model is influenced by a centralized, numbers-driven system, the legacy of the military-focused history of United Nations peacekeeping. One of the more significant differences between police and military peacekeepers is that military components are deployed to perform military tasks. Although police components may be mandated to perform traditional/operational policing tasks, they are more often expected to perform non-policing tasks as mentors or trainers and to advise on police reform, restructuring, and development. Another key difference is that while deployments to peace operations may be a positive factor for a military career, this is often not the case for police officers.

32. The wording and content of Security Council mandates regarding police tasks are rarely informed by comprehensive needs-based assessments, leading to many complications at the mission level including mandates that are not adapted to political realities, a lack of appreciation of the tasks required to achieve the mandate, and a mismatch between human resources and required tasks. United Nations efforts to address this are under way, such as through the Strategic Force Generation Cell but more could be done. Mandates, rather than being tailored to host country needs, tend to focus on the size of the police components, rather than the capabilities required.

33. In the immediate aftermath of crisis and conflict, significant numbers of police may be required for the protection of civilians and the establishment of public order. However, what is also required in the early phases of a mission is specialized support for restoring the core functions of the police institutions. This is more dependent on having the right competencies in key personnel, and to have personnel with the right skillset serving for longer terms in mission. It is also at this stage that the pressure for change is most significant. This is difficult within a system that puts priority on having ‘boots on the ground’, with its focus on numbers and relatively quick rotations, rather than specific expertise. When the situation in the country has stabilized, there is usually less need for the continued presence of high numbers of police, whether Formed Police Units (FPUs) or Individual Police Officers (IPOs), and the emphasis will often be on the institution building aspects of the host-State police service and related institutions. However, the way missions are mandated and funded leads to a somewhat static approach, where flexibility and adaptation to changing situations is difficult. It is also costly.

34. The current operating model is based on a series of assumptions which directly limit the ability of both Police Division and police components within missions to fulfil their mandate.

a) A paradox exists between the supply of a large number of regularly rotating personnel, usually police generalists, who are deployed to United Nations missions, and the long-term qualitative and structural challenges they are expected to address. The current model relies on having a high number of IPO’s deployed on a rather short term rotation (one year, with the possibility of extension<sup>19</sup>) to fulfil a capacity- and institution-building mandate which they are not trained to perform and which is complex and long-term in nature.

b) There is an assumption that a United Nations mission can easily adapt to changing needs, can identify and integrate lessons while using the ad-hoc capacity provided by IPOs. The truth, as one Head of Police Component put it, is not that police components have been in the mission area for up to 10 years, but that they have in effect been there for “one year, ten times over”. In reality, there is little evolution of the UNPOL approach or capacity to meet the changing needs of host-States. This undermines the objective of establishing the basic functions of the host-State police service as a core indicator for the right time to draw-down the peacekeeping operation.

c) The current operating model deploys technical experts, such as police investigators, to post-conflict countries and expects them to automatically become effective mentors, or even institution builders. In reality, police officers often find this transition difficult, especially when operating in unfamiliar environments. They need additional training on how to adapt their own experience in a United Nations mission environment.

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“ A paradox exists between the supply of a large number of regularly rotating personnel, usually police generalists, who are deployed to United Nations missions, and the long-term qualitative and structural challenges they are expected to address. ”

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<sup>19</sup> While most missions allow extensions for IPOs up to a maximum of three years, the system lacks predictability for longer terms institutional development efforts. Individual IPOs cannot guarantee their tenure for more than a year at a time, as extensions are requested and granted on an exceptional basis.

d) Furthermore, it is assumed that behavioural change and systemic reform can be brought about through co-location of UNPOL alone, in the absence of clear United Nations policy guidance on basic policing. While the Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) will do much to fill the current policy gap, at present United Nations Police components base their advice and guidance not on an agreed United Nations approach to policing but on the individual experiences of the police officers drawn from 100+ different Police Contributing Countries (PCCs). It is also true that organizational and cultural change in law enforcement structures are often a question of political will by the host-State government.

e) Finally, to improve, develop or build effective policing in any country requires engagement beyond the police organisation itself. Police reform and restructuring in post-conflict countries have to deal with a) a much broader scope of the institutional framework, such as oversight ministries, the justice chain, and parliamentary bodies, b) the political dynamics related to –and within– the police organisations, and c) stakeholders and security providers beyond the State.

35. Many of the above assumptions have been addressed at the policy level by the Strategic Guidance Framework, but have not yet led to a change of practice. One of the key questions for this review is why the SGF process has not yet had more of an impact on these issues.

36. In short, Member States and the Security Council are left with a stark choice. They can maintain the status quo and authorize more achievable mandates aligned to what police components can actually deliver under the current operating model (limited capacity building and institutional development). Or, they can support a change to the current operating model to enable police components to deliver on tailored mandates, by providing enhanced police capacities that could better meet the challenges of today's peace operations.

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**“ Member States and the Security Council...  
...can support a change to the current operating model to enable police components to deliver on tailored mandates, by providing enhanced police capacities that could better meet the challenges of today's peace operations. ”**

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# V. Responsibilities of Police Division

37. Within the UNPOL system, Police Division is assigned several specific responsibilities. The terms of reference for this review integrated the responsibilities described under the Police Division section of the Secretary-Generals Bulletin 2010<sup>20</sup> into three core responsibilities, namely to:

- a) Support the United Nations police components in the field;
- b) Provide strategic and technical advice to the United Nations senior leadership on international policing;
- c) Keep Member States abreast of United Nations police priorities, requirements and activities.

The review took these responsibilities of Police Division as its starting point.

38. While there is room to further clarify the wording around certain parts of the responsibilities, **the review team found that this description of the current responsibilities of the Police Division remains adequate.**

39. In the understanding and implementation of these responsibilities, however, the review team is of the opinion that the focus of Police Division should be primarily on supporting the police components, and Member States, to meet the needs of host-States of current and future United Nations peace operations. This field orientation and service function should be more clearly adopted by the United Nations and Police Division in any future description of responsibilities.

## Findings on Police Division Responsibilities

40. **Field missions have lacked effective support from Police Division at critical decision making points.** The HIPPO report called for the United Nations Secretariat to become more field-focused and for United Nations peace operations to be more people-centred, in order to better serve and protect the host-State communities they had been mandated to assist. The review team has found that Police Division is in need of this type of re-orientation, as it is currently strongly influenced by the needs and dynamics of United Nations headquarters<sup>21</sup>.

41. **Police Division is not fully empowered to provide police advice to influence DPKO and United Nations decision making.** Police Division is a core strategic and operational body within DPKO but its influence on strategic decision-making within the United Nations is not yet adequately integrated to result in the consistent application of policing knowledge and expertise into United Nations peace operations. Most notably few interviewees perceived that Police Division had been successful in articulating a strategic approach to United Nations policing-related tasks<sup>22</sup>, without which it is difficult to convince the United Nations system of the role and resources required to successfully deliver improved police outcomes in United Nations peace operations.

42. **Police Division could better manage engagement with Police Contributing Countries (PCCs).** Police Division continues to struggle to engage with PCCs to adequately meet both their needs for information, and the needs of field missions. Engaging PCCs in a more systematic way in the evolving needs of United Nations policing-related tasks might mean that they are better placed to provide the capacity required. In interviews several PCCs indicated that they do not feel as adequately informed by Police Division as they should be, and there was a lack of a regular, systemized and transparent means to be informed of United Nations' police priorities and needs<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Secretary-General's bulletin, Organization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, February 2010 (UN document ST/SGB/2010/1).

<sup>21</sup> Interviews in New York and the outcomes of the consultation in Entebbe.

<sup>22</sup> Interviews in New York, Haiti, CAR, the outcomes of the consultation in Entebbe, and by phone.

<sup>23</sup> Interviews conducted in New York.

## Recommendations on Police Division Responsibilities

43. **The field needs to be at the core of the focus of United Nations Police Division. This report proposes a series of concrete actions that will make Police Division more field-focused.** While the responsibilities assigned to Police Division are appropriate, the review team proposes a number of changes that will help reorient Police Division towards more effective support to field missions.

44. **The level of the Police Adviser in the United Nations Secretariat needs to be elevated, to enable the Police Division to provide police advice to the United Nations leadership and to influence DPKO and United Nations decision-making.** There needs to be parity between the level of the Military Adviser and the level of the Police Adviser, as further explained under the chapter on Structure<sup>24</sup>.

45. **A Police Advisory Committee (PAC) should be created,** to advise and assist the Secretariat on all questions relating to the use of police to maintain international peace and security, the deployment of officers placed at its disposal, and the institutional development role of United Nations Police missions<sup>25</sup>. Member States should consider to which United Nations entity this Committee should report. While groups like the ‘Senior Police Advisers Group’ and the ‘Group of Friends of United Nations Police’ already exist and are useful fora, they remain informal and ad-hoc bodies without a clear advisory role and with limited global representation.

<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that while the position of Police Adviser is elevated to enable her/him to perform their strategic advisory function to the UN system, their role as Director of the Police Division would remain at the same level, as would the Division as a whole.

<sup>25</sup> Unlike the Military Staff Committee this committee should permanently be structured to include, at least, the top ten PCC's (both FPU and IPO providers) as well as the Security Council members, in order to align the oversight provided with the police services and cultures that represent the majority of the United Nations police components that are deployed.

# VI. Towards a new Operating Model for United Nations Police

46. A functioning police institution is central to the stability of any country. Countries emerging from conflict suffer from institutional fragmentation, with multiple security providers and no primacy for the state police. It should be a core objective for the United Nations to help stabilize the situation and support the establishment of basic police functions under legitimate state authorities. This includes support to the main police services, as well as dealing with the range of other actors with policing authority. For the national police to function properly, it is also critical that the international community invests in establishing the rule of law across the criminal justice system, including the prosecution, justice and corrections services, as well as supporting management and oversight institutions. It is only when there is basic police capacity and minimum conditions to tackle impunity that peace operations can realistically consider exit.

47. Developing fully-fledged police and justice institutions is a long-term process. It goes far beyond the life span of a United Nations peace operation. A measure of success for the United Nations is to support the host-State in developing a police service with core functions in place, according to a few basic criteria and minimum standards. This would be the primary test for the exit of missions, in addition to the establishment of a system of oversight and accountability, and minimum capacity in the criminal justice system. It will not be possible to achieve the objectives of peace operations without making this happen.

48. The central role of police in United Nations peace operations is clearly acknowledged in Security Council Resolution 2185. That central role has not been implemented in practice. This has to change. While the mandates of police components have evolved significantly, the approach of Police Division and UNPOL has largely remained the same, making the achievement of their objective unlikely.

49. The Security Council is likely to continue authorising complex peace operation mandates for police components. For police components to have a better chance of achieving sustainable results there is a need for a **paradigm shift** in how United Nations Police support host-States. A new operating model for Police Division must build on the following key imperatives:

a) **Police must be at the centre of peace, stability and development:** Police Division must take its rightful place in United Nations decision making and United Nations headquarter structures. This has consequences for the positioning of the Police Division within DPKO and of Police Components in field missions. While United Nations engagement with host-States' police is technical, it is also inherently political in nature, and needs to be understood as such. The political dimension of police engagement needs to be better appreciated, at all levels, as clearly identified in the United Nations policy on *Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions*<sup>26</sup>.

b) **United Nations Security Council Mandates must be sequenced and flexible:** As contexts change, mandates need to adapt, be based on an assessment of the current need, with consequences for the approach taken, the capacity needed, and the mission's priorities. This implies the implementation of a two-stage mandating process in accordance with the recommendation of HIPPO, making sure that mandates are tailor-made and achievable. The sequential mandating process, in principle agreed by the Security Council, now needs to be implemented. Police components have two key objectives: firstly, securing the peace through stabilizing the situation and secondly, ensuring stability by building up core functions of the national police<sup>27</sup>. Securing the peace requires higher numbers, while reform, restructuring and police development implies a lean, targeted police structure in missions. A change in the nature of the capacity and the numbers of personnel required is necessary and flexibility should be an integral part of how UNPOL operates.

<sup>26</sup> DPKO/DFS Reference 2014.1.

<sup>27</sup> It should be noted however that these tasks are not always sequential; and that they can often run in parallel. In some cases, even across one Mission area, for example, western DRC may require more SSR/police reform while eastern DRC may require more immediate security stabilization support.

c) **United Nations Police must be field- and results oriented:** Police components should be measured on results, which involve both the successful protection of communities, and the development of host-State police capability. As the HIPPO-report highlighted: “There must be an awakening of United Nations headquarters to the distinct and important needs of field missions,”<sup>28</sup> and in this regard a renewed resolve by Police Division to support police components in the field.

<sup>28</sup> HIPPO report, p. 10.

d) **Authority must be decentralized to empower police components to deliver:** Implementing a flexible and host-State driven system requires decisions to be made as close to the issues as possible. Systems and functions should be decentralized, such as management tools and human resources. The recruitment of police officers for police development should be field-led<sup>29</sup>, which implies that Head of Police Components in mission lead the process in collaboration with headquarters.

<sup>29</sup> While it was acknowledged by heads of police components that this would require dedicated resources within the component, those that had done so felt that the positive outcomes on recruitment quality were worth the costs.

e) **Recruitment must be results-driven:** The police capacity required to fulfil the mandate of providing protection differ from those required to assist with police reform and institutional development. Numerous additional competencies and experience, over and above direct policing expertise, are required for successful police institutional development<sup>30</sup>. Police Development Officers/Teams and Civilian Experts are essential for reform and restructuring purposes. More effort needs to be made by Police Division and PCCs to deploy such experts, through the normal secondment system, to United Nations Police components. As a post-conflict country becomes more stable, the need for multidisciplinary teams grows, providing missions with police and civilian experts with a variety of skillsets.


<sup>30</sup> See for example, DPKO/DFS Evaluation Report April 2013; Evaluation of the use of civilian police experts to support capacity building in the National Police of Timor-Leste.

f) **A culture of accountability must be developed:** A culture of accountability is needed on multiple levels, at headquarters and in the field, starting with transparency on recruitment and improved Police Division reporting to Member States. The Police Adviser should be empowered by the Secretary General and the Security Council to exercise substantive oversight of police components in the field. The police CONOPS should constitute the accountability framework between the Heads of Police Components and Headquarters for delivery of the mandate, with performance and delivery to be regularly reviewed.

g) **There must be coordination and coherence in approach, between the actors and institutions across the criminal justice chain:** Police reform in isolation will have limited success, as the police do not exist in isolation from the wider system of criminal justice, or those who manage and oversee policing services. Although UNPOL often operates within the Rule of Law-pillar in missions, and is supposed to link up with other sections working on the criminal justice system, this does not always happen in practice. Police reform as part of a broader process of security sector reform is essential, not least given the need to recognize the link between the actors of the criminal justice system, and the need to manage the politics around security and justice reform. Police components should not be development agencies, but need to take a developmental approach to police institution building, and from the outset coordinate with development actors, such as UNDP and bilateral agencies<sup>31</sup>. While police components support the development of core functions of national police, other important aspects need to be catered for by other development actors and specialized agencies. It is when such coordination works that transition to the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) can be possible and an earlier exit of a mission can be envisaged.

“ Numerous additional skills and experience, over and above direct policing expertise, are required for successful police institutional development ”

<sup>31</sup> The Global Focal Point Arrangement for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations was created for this purpose, and could be a vehicle through which to integrate a developmental approach to UNPOL components.



SOURCE: REVIEW TEAM, DCAF/ISSAT

50. **The assessment of the context, capacities and needs of host-States will determine the number of UNPOL needed to address a) the protection of civilians, including women and children, b) the protection of the United Nations mission and c) police reform, restructuring and development.** An accurate assessment would allow fine-tuning of the mandate for the police component and differentiating between the capacities needed for each of the above challenges. Regular strategic assessments and strategic reviews should assess the host-States' progress and their capacity requirements, enabling consideration of the rationale for the continued presence and numbers of FPU and police protection officers.

51. **A new deployment and recruitment system will have a better chance of providing police components with capacities that are fit for purpose.** Such a system would delineate between police officers focused on protection aspects of mandates, including both protection of civilians and protection of United Nations personnel, and the police and civilians who focused on the reform, restructuring and development tasks. This will also better enable the Security Council to be more targeted and results oriented in their mandating of police components.

52. **To effectively implement the new recruitment categories within police components will require further work,** including alignment with existing DPKO policies and guidance on Protection of Civilians (POC), as well as with the new police specific policy on POC (which needs to be completed as a priority). On the use of development-oriented approaches to generate better results in capacity transfer and institutional development, more work is needed to translate these practices into workable tools for police components. Clarity on all these issues will be imperative before the new system is implemented.

53. **Regular assessment of needs will enable the Security Council, PCCs and Member States to provide more targeted and effective United Nations support at each stage, as conditions change.** Generally, the need for police protection officers and FPUs will be higher at the outset, in more volatile and insecure environments, reducing as the situation stabilizes. The numbers of FPUs and Police Protection Officers should be reduced on the basis of an assessment once the situation stabilizes; Police Development Officers/Teams and Civilian Experts, who assist with institutional development, would remain in the mission throughout. As the window for reform is greatest at the outset, rapid deployment of these officers and experts is essential. As the reform, restructuring, and development efforts progress, relatively more officers and experts should be deployed - based on the needs and the absorptive capacity of host-State's police institutions. These numbers would still be lower than those currently deployed on United Nations peace operations.

### BOX 1: UNPOL CIVILIAN POLICE EXPERTS IN TIMOR-LESTE

Capacity building of host-state police is a long-term task that requires multi-disciplinary skills. To address this issue, in 2010, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), in conjunction with Timor-Leste partners, deployed 19 additional civilian police experts to implement specific capacity-building initiatives – the first time civilians were used on a large scale for such support functions. The civilian experts were integrated into the UNMIT police chain, a key success factor along with access to funding. Key areas of expertise were related to management, administration, human resources, databases, finance, and project management/donor coordination. An evaluation of the UNMIT initiative in 2013 recommended that “the civilian police expert function should be institutionalized” in the future, with Standing Police Capacity (SPC) covering gaps pending the arrival of experts in the mission<sup>32</sup>.

Source: Evaluation report on the use of civilian police experts to support capacity building in the National Police of Timor-Leste (April 2013), DPKO/DFS.

<sup>32</sup> Evaluation report on the use of civilian police experts to support capacity building in the National Police of Timor-Leste (April 2013), DPKO/DFS.

54. **Rather than deploying high numbers of police officers and meeting only the “authorized strength” described in Security Council mandates, the incentives of the proposed new model on UNPOL deployment would be the converse.** The more targeted and tailor-made the UNPOL support and the more coherently the police component works with other actors, the more effective it will be at achieving results. Continued high numbers of FPUs and Police Protection Officers will not be a good indicator, neither for the country, nor for the police component, because it indicates continued instability in the host-State. As the situation stabilizes the protection component of the mission should reduce in size, with more opportunity for engagement on the institutional development aspects of the mandate, and a commensurate increase in the UNPOL capacity to support reform and institutional development (see Annex 1 for an outline of, and the connection, between different United Nations Police roles in institutional development). It is when there is progress on the development of host-State police capability, through the establishment of basic core police functions that exit of the mission can be foreseen.

# VII. Functions of Police Division

55. In order for Police Division to implement this new operating model, it will need to be able to effectively and efficiently deliver a number of functions to field missions, to the United Nations Secretariat, and to the PCC's. The range of tasks of Police Division can be summarized in six main key functions. Each key function has some relevance for all three responsibilities of Police Division, but some functions are more focused on one of the responsibilities.

- **Function 1, Leadership:** Provide strategic direction to field missions and act as global lead on police issues within the United Nations system.
- **Function 2, Planning:** Conduct strategic police planning.
- **Function 3, Recruitment:** Provide selection and recruitment for United Nations Police components.
- **Function 4, Knowledge:** Manage knowledge, information, train personnel, and provide policy guidance on United Nations policing-related tasks.
- **Function 5, Accountability:** Provide accountability and oversight for policing outcomes in peace operations.
- **Function 6, Partnerships:** Build strategic police partnerships.

## *Function 1, Leadership: Provide strategic direction to field missions and act as global lead on police issues within the United Nations system*

56. Police Division is expected to lead the integration of police issues and implementation of police mandates in United Nations peace operations. This includes providing strategic direction on police issues to the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the other elements of the United Nations system. It involves effectively advising police components of the United Nations' strategic police priorities, and supporting those components within headquarters. It also entails Police Division taking the lead in providing advice and advocacy on police needs to the PCCs.

## **Findings on the Leadership Function**

57. **The role and importance of policing in peace operations is not adequately represented in the United Nations system.** The influence of Police Division within DPKO and the United Nations system is not commensurate with its responsibilities, its role and contribution to mission mandates. This is reflected both at the headquarters and the field level, and has its roots in the current structures, leadership and the current approach being taken to peace operations in general. DPKO systems and processes, in particular, are overly influenced by the military approach and paradigm. Police Division currently lacks appropriate influence on United Nations debates around policing issues, and in planning the policing components of peace operations.

58. **The Police Adviser's role, influence and support function for the Heads of Police Components is poorly articulated.** The consistent message received from field personnel, is that the reporting line from Heads of Police Components to the Police Adviser is informal and irregular<sup>33</sup>. This makes it difficult for Police Division to exercise substantive oversight, provide guidance on the United Nations police priorities, and provide strategic advice to ensure current operations are embedded in a long-term perspective. Political decisions at mission level in one mission may have an impact on both UNPOL policy and the approach taken in another. A substantive oversight role by Police Division would allow consideration of such decisions from an United Nations-wide policing perspective.

<sup>33</sup> Outcome from the consultations in Entebbe.

59. **Police Division has not yet been able to provide policy leadership.** After an extended development process, the policy level of the SGF for UNPOL is now mostly complete<sup>34</sup>. Police Division is crucial to providing the field and UNPOL stakeholders with strategic and technical guidance, directives, and manuals. The division is expected to support their implementation, including monitoring, and when needed, enforcing its implementation and fostering accountability. Leadership gaps at several levels within Police Division are hampering the implementation and follow-up of the SGF policy documents, and existing accountability mechanisms so far have not brought the necessary changes in United Nations police practice.

<sup>34</sup> The SGF consists of the DPKO/DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (which went into effect in February 2014), four guidelines on capacity-building and development, police command, police operations and administration as well as detailed manuals and training documents.

60. **Police Division is struggling to represent and resolve field mission challenges at United Nations headquarters.** A consistent message from field mission is that the Police Division has not been able to raise challenges and difficulties identified in the field by the Heads of Police Components, nor to ensure that OROLSI/DPKO, DFS and DPA work together to address them<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> Interviews in New York, Entebbe, Haiti, CAR, and by phone.

61. **Police Division is working to improve gender equality within UNPOL, but much remains to be done.** Police Division is represented at the 'DPKO/DFS Gender Task Force' that is convened at the Director level. Police Division's gender-dedicated structure and its access to decision-making is not currently adequate to meet the needs of the Women Peace and Security agenda, and improve gender equality in all United Nations police peace operations.

62. **Police Division is not able to adequately support special political missions without additional funding.** As HIPPO noted, political missions and conflict prevention activities of the United Nations are seriously under-resourced<sup>36</sup>. For Police Division this currently means they service five additional political missions, in addition to the 13 peacekeeping missions that are their primary responsibility. This impacts all of the core functions of Police Division and puts a strain on staff and resources that are already thinly spread.

<sup>36</sup> HIPPO report, Summary, p.15 and 30, 333.

63. **Police Division has limited ability to properly manage and oversee Formed Police Units (FPUs).** While DFS (Department of Field Support) is providing consistent and coherent oversight of FPU equipment availability and operability, and exacting financial penalties to encourage PCC's to address issues, the Police Division is constrained from providing adequate management and oversight<sup>37</sup>. Repeated internal assessments have pointed to a lack of strategic guidance on how, where and when FPU's should protect civilians. FPUs have been dispersed and deployed on static guard duties<sup>38</sup>, in disregard of DPKO's FPU Policy. Police Division has so far not managed to effectively support heads of police components to address divergent approaches by FPUs to the Protection of Civilians, which has hampered the consistency of those efforts<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> Contingent Owned Equipment shortfalls continue to pose serious challenges to performance.

<sup>38</sup> 67% of the FPU strength in MINUSCA, which was under the (military) command of the Bangui Joint Taskforce, was dispersed and being used in static guard duty when the review team visited.

<sup>39</sup> Several internal reviews have found significant differences in the Protection of Civilian approaches.

64. **The absence of needed strategic guidance from DPKO and Police Division is resulting in what is perceived by many as the militarization of FPUs.** Military control and militarization of United Nations police components is problematic for the United Nations, which is trying to re-establish the primacy of non-military, community-oriented policing as part of a return to a stable post-conflict environment. While there is a DPKO/DFS policy on FPUs, it is not being consistently followed, and Police Division seems unable to enforce it. A militarized police sends improper signals to host-States who, post conflict, need to demilitarize police in their communities.

## Recommendations on the Leadership Function

65. **The position of the United Nations Police Adviser should be elevated to the level of ASG and be double hatted, reporting to the Under Secretary-General DPKO (as Police Adviser) and the ASG OROLSI (as Director of Police Division).** The Police Adviser needs to be able to influence policing issues effectively within the United Nations, including strategic discussions and decisions on mandates, resources, and the overall approach to peace operations. This requires closer engagement across the Secretariat, with the Security Council, Member States, PCCs, United Nations legislative bodies as well as the C34 peacekeeping committee. As such, the Police Adviser should have a formal role as an adviser to the USG in DPKO and the wider United Nations system on policing; while operationally working to integrate United Nations police reform into the rule of law system, as part of OROLSI (see full recommendation under responsibilities, and reference to OROLSI under Implementation).

66. **The Police Adviser should be empowered to provide the United Nations with leadership on technical police issues, substantive oversight of the application of UNPOL policy, as well as strategic advice on planning and decision-making.** Direct management oversight of the police components should remain with the SRSG as the head of mission. That operational level oversight is separate to the technical and substantive policy oversight on police issues, which should be the responsibility of the Police Adviser in New York.

67. **Police Division is the voice of police components in the United Nations headquarters, and must be effective in ensuring police representation in all strategic decision making.** This will take different forms, from ensuring policing issues are addressed throughout strategic planning and implementation, supporting the flexible modification of policing mandates in response to a change in the situation, brokering funding arrangements, and negotiating partnerships across the United Nations system. At present Police Division is more reactive than proactive, responding to requests rather than clearly advancing the police strategic position and requirements. To advance the police agenda requires that Police Division, especially the Police Adviser, must remain in regular contact with Heads of Police Components, and have the capability to address their issues when identified. The consistent message from field missions was that such communication was not happening on a regular basis<sup>40</sup>.

68. **Police Division must provide strategic direction to Police Contributing Countries to improve the number of women within all levels of field operations, as well as headquarters.** While acknowledging the progress that has been made, addressing the persistent difficulties in achieving gender targets will require clear Police Division leadership and strong collaboration with the Gender Task Force. Police Division should ensure that the current DPKO review of gender includes consideration of the gender aspects of recruitment and selection strategies, and then provide advice on targeted measures to support PCCs in their commitment to increase the number and seniority of police women deployed on peacekeeping operations. The expansion of seconded civilian policing experts (see section on Recruitment Function for explanation of seconded civilian policing experts) could also provide new opportunities to increase the deployment of more women into police components.

69. **Police Division's support to police components of Special Political Missions must be funded.** Given the importance of support in the police area, it is likely that the requirement to support police components in Special Political Missions will continue to expand. This issue would be easier to manage if the Secretary-General's proposal, to appropriately fund Special Political Missions, was adopted. Until such time, this understaffing problem will persistently tax the Police Division's ability to fulfil its mission. An increase in funds through the regular budget to the Department of Political Affairs for the back-stopping functions to such missions is also needed.

70. **Police Division must be provided with the proper mechanisms to hold missions accountable, and lead on the enforcement of FPU policy.** The oversight of FPUs should be supported throughout Police Division. Direct support and oversight of deployed FPUs should be the responsibility of Mission Management and Support Section (MMSS), while FPU policy oversight managed should be the responsibility of the policy team. Where Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) are not adhered to, including on the issue of FPU mobility within the mission area, this should be part of on-going strategic discussions with PCCs. FPUs are to be deployed for the purpose of public order management, protection of United Nations personnel and facilities, and supporting police operations and protecting civilians in higher threat environments. They operate best under principles of unit integrity, and should not be broken up piecemeal or deployed into static guard duties. This is merely to suggest that they should be deployed in a manner which is consistent with the 2010 policy of FPUs. This is not always the case at present.

<sup>40</sup> Interviews in New York and the consultation in Entebbe confirmed that this is not occurring systematically.

## **Function 2, Planning: Conduct strategic police planning**

71. Police Division is responsible for strategic planning for police components. This includes providing police specific input into the process to develop mission mandates and the police CONOPS, along with monitoring potential contingency operations. It also includes the requirement for Police Division to be able to provide a mission start-up capability when required.

### **Findings on the Planning Function**

72. **Police issues are insufficiently integrated into current peace operation mandate design and planning.** Too often the Police Division appears not to be adequately involved in the planning process in New York. This is related as much to the positioning of the Police Division within DPKO and in relation to other key interlocutors as its limited available planning capacity. While the HIPPO report recommended that United Nations Police strategies should be based on capacity assessments in country, reflected in mission planning, this has yet to materialize.

73. **The lack of a proper needs-assessment in mission planning implies that the numbers of IPOs and FPU included in Security Council resolutions is not based on a clear analysis.** The pressure on mobilizing high numbers of IPOs and FPUs, as well as the pressure to re-hat existing capabilities, for new missions further exacerbates several of the problems outlined in this report. For IPOs a significant number of interlocutors, including host-States, questioned the usefulness of the high numbers of IPOs, unless visible presence was needed for a period of time. As regards the FPUs, challenges related to meeting standards of performance, quality of equipment and resources were highlighted.

74. **Mandates and strategic planning documents, including the CONOPS, are not providing the necessary guidance on what success would look like for UNPOL.** The strategic planning documents developed in the United Nations tend to lack clear guidance on what the achievable end state is, and how it will be measured. This gap in clarity of intent and outcomes contributes to difficulties in measuring progress towards the goals, and thus the draw-down of the mission. There are, however, also other factors beyond the police service that are determining such outcomes. Among the most important are political dynamics, as well the capability of those institutions that manage and oversee the police and the wider justice chain.

75. **Police planning capability is not adequately empowered under the current Police Division structure.** The position of planning, under the Strategy, Policy and Development Section (SPDS), displaces it from the Integrated Operational Team (IOT), directly impacting on its ability to influence department-wide planning processes. The IOT police liaison officers are not selected or trained for strategic planning capability, despite the role of the IOT being to lead the creation of the mission concept, ensure operational alignment with the mission strategy, and support the development of the police and military CONOPS. This dislocation is exacerbated by the direct hiring of the liaison officers by the IOT, who do not seem to be spending the recommended one-year rotation thorough Police Division prior to deploying into the IOT<sup>41</sup>.

76. **Very few police officers have experience in strategic planning for the deployment of police capabilities on peace operations prior to working for the United Nations.** Planning for and deploying police components and capabilities into peace operations is a rare task in national police services, and as such is not a skill that most police officers have. With much of the Police Division's planning capacity based on seconded personnel from Member States, significant training is required to educate new personnel in United Nations peace operation planning. In many cases, it takes up to a year for planners to be working at an optimal level.

<sup>41</sup> A/66/615. United Nations Police: Report of the Secretary-General, 2011.

## **BOX 2: PLANNING FOR INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS – A MILITARY TASKING, A NEW POLICE SKILL**

While the military have personnel trained and tasked to prepare for international deployments, by comparison it is not a traditional police task and therefore not a core skill that it can be assumed police organizations possess.

The Office of Military Affairs currently has 33 planning officers. The Police Division has seven planners for the same number of peacekeeping missions while also covering planning for Special Political Missions.

77. **The Police Division strategic planning capacity is severely under-resourced.** This staffing shortage means that Police Division is often not able to provide the required input into United Nations peace operation planning processes. The deficit in planning personnel remains unchanged since the 2008 Internal Review of Police Division, in which it was noted that the police planning team had seven positions, compared to 30 military posts. This disparity remains, despite the increasing numbers of missions, police deployed and requirement for police planning input.

## **Recommendations on the Planning Function**

78. **Planning peace operations and their police mandates must be based on a sequenced approach, and a thorough political and technical analysis of the context, capacities and needs of the host-State.** Policing is deeply political. The HIPPO report outlined a new system for how mandates are provided and planning is undertaken. This system would include an initial, temporary mission commitment authority, giving the mandate to start up the mission, with the assessment and planning being field-based and the CONOPS process being developed in close consultation with the field mission and the host-State<sup>42</sup>. This should occur before the formal mandate is put in place and would result in a better assessment of the capacities and needs, and a more tailor-made mandate. This sequenced mandating approach should be implemented.

<sup>42</sup> HIPPO-report, 16 June 2015:pp 45-48, paras 169-177

79. **Regular strategic assessments (not just strategic reviews or component reviews) should be more systematically used to adapt United Nations Police resources allocated to the mission.** A more context-specific approach needs to drive analysis, sharper assessment, strategy formulation, and planning. This can provide the basis for changing from a more protection and stabilization oriented presence with higher emphasis on numbers of police to a smaller presence of police officers, focusing on supporting the core functions of the police and development of police institutions. As soon as the police environment allows, missions should as quickly as possible move to the latter and redeploy FPU and IPOs that are no longer required. Every strategic review for the purposes of mandate continuation should explicitly justify the continued number of FPUs within the mission, rather than assume that they will be maintained.

80. **The Police Division should be resourced and empowered to be a fundamental component of the United Nations strategic planning of peace operations.** Through an empowered, adequately staffed, and well-integrated police planning capability, and the associated robust assessment processes, linking the field and headquarters, the United Nations should ensure that United Nations Police strategic guidance is both understood and appropriately represented in Security Council mandates. Improving the United Nations' understanding of policing from the strategic planning onwards will assist in setting realistic goals and enable better monitoring of progress against those goals.

## ***Function 3, Recruitment: Provide selection and recruitment for United Nations police components***

81. Police Division is responsible for the selection and deployment of police personnel to the field, including managing rotations, extensions, and aptitude testing. This function includes selection assistance to PCCs and collaborating with DFS on FPU equipment negotiation and MOUs. Police Division also has a responsibility to provide in-service training in specialist skills as required to supplement police components.

## Findings on the Recruitment Function

82. **Police Division is struggling to provide police components with personnel who satisfy the full range of required skills and competencies using the current recruitment system.** The remit of police mandates has expanded quickly, and the recruitment system has not managed to meet all the requirements of the wider police role in peace operations. This is most noticeable in missions with significant institutional reform responsibilities, where a wide range of highly specific types of knowledge are required. The recruitment system of Police Division continues to be numbers driven, focused on the deployment of (over 13,000 UNPOL officers) large numbers to meet authorised strengths, without adequate matching individual skills to the mission's needs. As a result, UNPOL resources are not optimal to enable them to build host-States' institutions. Moreover, UNPOL missions are being weighed down by ill-adapted capacity that uses the mission's resources and do not contribute to achieving its goals.

83. **There are widespread perceptions of possible inconsistencies or potential abuses in the complex and multi-actor process of providing human resources to the field mission.** The factors influencing these perceptions include:

- A high number of rotating police personnel selected from a very large pool of providers
- Unclear separation of the decision making power
- A complex, centralized and lengthy procedure
- Limited transparency
- Important financial and positional stakes in appointments

84. There are several weaknesses in the procedural steps within the overall process, and not surprisingly, some cases of abuses have been identified by the United Nations itself<sup>43</sup>. Although it does not have full control over this process, and despite its efforts to improve policies, Police Division faces a high reputational risk because of its central role.

<sup>43</sup> HIPPO-report, 16 June 2015:pp 45-48, paras 169-177

85. **The current recruitment process for UNPOL positions in field missions is lengthy, contributing to substantive delays in getting the correct capacity to the field.** The process for IPO recruitment enables or contributes to delays in a number of ways. These include delays in anticipating vacancies, in turning mission requests into formal requests to PCC's, the process of submitting all recruitment offers through the permanent delegations in New York, and delays associated with medical clearance<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Acknowledging that medical clearances are outside the responsibility of Police Division, and that delays are a United Nations system wide issue

### BOX 3: RECURRENT RECRUITMENT GAPS IN MINUSTAH

In MINUSTAH, three of the four leadership positions in the Police Component were filled by acting appointees when the review team visited. The post of Head of Police Component (HOPC) had been vacant for three months (since December 2015), and the Deputy Head of Police Component remained vacant through four announcements for the position. There had been no confirmed appointment of a Chief of Staff since mid-2015, although the post was first advertised in December 2014. MINUSTAH leadership had not received an adequate explanation for why filling posts in the Police Component had become a recurrent problem.

Source: Data from MINUSTAH, Police Division

86. **The recruitment process for Police Division/headquarters posts is slow, with significant delays in personnel filling positions, which puts a severe strain on the current personnel.** At present the average amount of time it takes to fill headquarter posts (from announcement to arrival in position) is just less than one year. While much of the recruitment process is outside the hands of Police Division, and is part of a broader need for United Nations human resources reform, Police Division's extensive use of seconded staff should facilitate better succession planning. See Annex 2.

87. **Field missions do not consistently hold adequate control over the process of recruitment.** While some police components have successfully created recruitment support sections to better manage the process, a number of missions continue to be dissatisfied with their ability to get and retain the correct

people. Recruitment frameworks used by Police Division to determine police component skill requirements are too generic and are not used to their full potential by missions, even though they are intended to be adapted to mission needs and restructured if needed. Too many recruitment processes do not provide police components with the personnel they need to deliver on their mandated tasks. **For good practice examples of recruitment and selection de-centralization to the field see Box 5.**

88. **Pre-deployment assessments have a limited ability to ensure personnel with the right capacity and competencies are deployed to missions.** The basic skills tested by the Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) are mission specific language (including a short interview), firearm proficiency, and driving competency. Approximately 55% of the candidates put forward by the PCCs do not meet the minimum SAAT requirements. None of these processes adequately take into account the additional competencies required to fulfil the increasingly complex policing mandates such as reform, restructuring, as well as institutional development. These require specialist experience coupled with the ability to effectively advise host-State police. As a result significant numbers of police are deployed to missions without the right competencies for the reform tasks they are expected to undertake.

89. **Efforts to provide police components with improved capabilities through the use of civilian experts have yet to be consistently integrated.** While both Resolution 2185 and the HIPPO report identified the importance of integrating civilian expertise into police components where appropriate, little has been achieved to make this a reality. The positive contribution of civilian experts in United Nations missions has also been recognised in the *Evaluation of the Civilian component of UNPOL in UNMIT* (See further Box 1). Several skills that police components need to access, including political/process/change management, governance, SSR, strategic planning, donor relations, human resource and financial management, information technology and administration system management, are more commonly found in civilian staff. Furthermore, support to civilian oversight functions in ministries of interior and justice are not catered for. These are also essential for transparency and accountability in the police service, and for links with the justice chain to be ensured. Despite this, Police Division has not yet managed to consistently and successfully integrate seconded civilian experts in police components.

90. **Efforts to provide specialised teams have yet to be well integrated into Police Division recruitment.** While a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of specialized teams has yet to occur, there was a call from the field for more specialized capacity and specialized teams to support their institutional reforms. These were perceived to have helped overcome some key challenges around rotation of staff, loss of institutional memory and coherence of policing approach and advice. Despite this Police Division has not yet managed to consistently and successfully integrate specialized teams into the full range of peace operations. The recruitment processes remain designed to deliver large numbers of IPO's and FPU's, resulting in unnecessary difficulty in the deployment of other capabilities.

91. **The current UNPOL rotation policy is disruptive to the process of capacity development.** For key capacity development and project-focused positions, continuity is crucial. One year is a minimal period required to establish the trust and networks to support effective institutional development efforts. The relatively short deployment length contributes to a loss of institutional memory, trust between national partners, limited progress, repetition of activities, and the confusion of host-State partners.

92. **Police Division faces great difficulties in managing succession planning for police components and headquarter positions, especially in leadership roles.** While some problems in replacing staff are to be expected, given the need for regular rotations and the multiple stakeholders involved in extension decisions, the extent of delays in the provision of personnel is having a clear negative effect on police component operations.

93. **Experience in other fields suggests that capacity transfer is more effective with knowledge of the local culture and setting.** It is likely that this also applies to individuals doing capacity building in a policing environment, with regard to language, cultural knowledge, and approach to policing. This is relevant in relation to recruitment to the development stream. However, this also needs to be assessed against possible political dynamics and security factors which in certain situations may be related to neighbouring countries.

94. **Despite real efforts, recruitment of women for United Nations Police peace operations remains below the target of 20%.** In 2009, Police Division launched the Global Effort Initiative, correctly encouraging PCC's to contribute female officers at the same ratio as women are represented in their national police organization. It has invested considerable efforts in giving visibility to the role of women in police components, through the International Association of Women Police (IAWP) and the related conferences. Police Division has developed and widely disseminated trainings, guidance and tools to accompany stakeholders in recruitment of women and training uniformed personnel on gender-sensitive approaches. Evidence shows that the Global Effort Initiative has achieved some success, in particular through the all-female SAAT initiative. However, it has not yet had the desired impact. In reality, decision-making about deployment of women police to UN missions rests with the PCCs. Given that many of the largest PCC's have only 6-9% women police officers in their national police institutions, Police Division cannot be held solely responsible for delivering the desired improvements.

## Recommendations on the Recruitment Function

95. **The different tasks of current police mandates require separate recruitment streams.** The police expertise required for the protection aspects of peace operation mandates is different from that required for institutional development. Both will be better supported if recruitment for each is treated separately. Under the proposed system, positions within the reform pillars of missions should be reclassified as "development", and recruited differently. In order to better supply the expertise required for recent peace operation mandates, Police Division should have two distinct processes to support the recruitment of four types of personnel required by missions. Under the protection stream would be:

- *Police Protection Officers* able to support the re-establishment of the security situation, performing tasks such as providing operational support to host-State police, supporting the protection of civilians, United Nations security tasks, patrolling and monitoring in partnership with the host-State police.
- *Formed Police Units*, to provide the higher-end policing protection capabilities required by United Nations missions, including SWAT, public order management, and protection of United Nations/civilian capabilities.

The development stream would be composed of:

- *Police Development Officers and Development Teams*, to provide mentoring, capacity building, training and strategic advice on the institutional reform, restructuring and development of host-State police.
- *Seconded Civilian Experts*, to perform functions such as building capability in the police oversight organisations (the relevant ministry, a police ombudsman etc.), human resources management, financial management, programme management, donor coordination, and various institutional reform functions that do not require police skills or training<sup>45</sup>.

96. **The regular Strategic Assessments and Reviews-process is expected to assess and propose changes in the composition of the police component and the numbers deployed.** According to progress made, and depending on the situation, the expectation is that the requirements for deployments under the protection stream are less needed and can be reduced, while the development stream should be enhanced.

<sup>45</sup> From the administrative point of view,  
 - The Police Protection Officers and the Police Development Officers would be recruited from the current administrative secondment system. The Police Development Officers would need to meet additional selection criteria beyond the SAAT, depending on the requested capacities.  
 -The Seconded Civilian Experts are recruited under the current administrative system that allows PCCs to second experts without pre-requisite police education and police experience.

In addition, some additional professional positions will be required support the development stream.

#### BOX 4: UNMISS: USE OF SPECIALIZED TEAMS FROM RWANDA AND UGANDA

South Sudan at independence had no functional police service. Realizing that the generalists deployed through the normal IPO-system did not provide the expertise needed to develop the service, UNMISS' Police Component, in dialogue with the Inspector General of the South Sudan National Police Service, requested Rwanda and Uganda to provide selected teams of police officers qualified to do training at the National Police College. The teams were pre-identified as UNPOL, but arrived as a team. The team was supplemented by South African and Zimbabwean trainers, deployed in states which had established state training centres.

The trainers brought their national police training modules, which were subsequently tailored to modules adapted to the South Sudan circumstances, in alignment with the Constitution, and relevant legislation and penal codes. The training included basic policing, crime investigations, traffic management, police management and leadership, as well as gender and child protection, among other things.

While the training was interrupted by the outbreak of civil war in the country, the pre-crisis feedback on the impact and utility of the training from all levels of the South Sudan National Police Service was very positive. Of particular note was that the training provided by police officers from the region was more closely aligned and adapted to the needs of the South Sudan National Police Service.

Source: While this experience has not been evaluated, the above assessment was based on several interviews.

97. **The Police Division must work with Police Contributing Countries to ensure that a wide range of countries offer expertise in police reform and development to the United Nations, and to encourage their secondment of civilian capacities.** Recognising that a significant shift is being proposed to draw the right capabilities into UNPOL, a 3-5 year plan should be established to help PCC's make the transition. Police Division facilitation of more joint initiatives and twinning between PCCs, to help build the new required capacities, could assist with this transition.

98. **The Head of the Police Component should be the lead for selection of personnel, and empowered to oversee all stages of the recruitment process.** The role of Police Division and the Selection and Recruitment Section (SRS) is to manage and facilitate the administration of the process and enable the mission to select the right people. Police Division should support each mission in organizing and developing task specific job descriptions for key capacity-building and institutional-development positions. The recent good practice on a decentralized approach to human resources championed by UNMIL, MONUSCO and UNAMID should be the rule rather than the exception (see further Box 5).

#### BOX 5: DECENTRALIZATION OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS IN UNMIL

Evidence from UNMIL shows the positive outcomes of missions taking the lead on recruitment of their officers. UNMIL developed its own matrix for skills selection, and then led the short-listing and interview process. UNMIL supplied SRS with a clear list of specific key qualities they need for certain positions. SRS mobilizes nominations based on those few criteria. Mission leadership and relevant staff interview each candidate, shortlist the most relevant candidates, and supply the list to Police Division in order of priority. SRS then contacts PCCs and manages the clearance and administrative contracting process.

While UNMIL are in the draw-down phase, this approach is useful for all missions as it allows SRS to oversee a process that is demand-driven. SRS needs to be proactive in encouraging, supporting and preparing missions for such a shift, as well as ensuring they have and use the right tools.

Source: UNMIL.

99. **Increase and expand the pool of senior police candidates (particularly senior police officers who are women) for all positions on the senior management team of the police component.** This would be valuable to address current gaps that exist for critical reform and development posts across many police components. Engage with PCCs and invest in career development training of rostered candidates to ensure their readiness for rapid deployment.

100. **In order to protect itself against perceived or potential abuse, Police Division should proactively undertake a set of visible measures to reinforce the integrity of the recruitment process:**

a) **Dividing the responsibilities:** To avoid any potential perception of conflict of interest, it is recommended that Police Division considers dispatching the responsibilities on the following critical functions amongst separate and independent Police Division entities: a) Engagement with PCC's, b) determination of mission need, c) SAAT and FPAT assessments, and d) recruitment.

b) **Decentralizing recruitment decision making to field mission:** Empowering the field mission to lead the recruitment process and play the decision making role reduces Police Division involvement in the human resource process to one of facilitating mission decisions.

c) **Reducing procedural steps:** Any procedural step that implies an administrative authorisation is understood as potentially vulnerable to abuse. Reducing these steps contributes to fostering institutional integrity. (See further Figure 3)

d) **Continue insulating staff from conflicting interests:** Maintain and publicise the rule that no Police Division or field staff should be involved in the recruitment process or decisions pertaining to national counterparts.

e) **Wide and transparent advertisement:** Recruitment for all United Nations Police positions should be announced openly on the UNPOL website. This would enable all PCCs to have complete visibility of the range of current recruitment requests and will promote transparency by opening opportunities to simultaneous visibility of Member States in New York and in national capitals<sup>46</sup>.

f) **Requesting extension of the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships oversight to cover police components.** By 2018 OPSP should be tasked with a review of the new selection and recruitment process both in PCCs and in Police Division<sup>47</sup>. Exceptionally, this report should be made public (all other reports by OPSP are confidential).


g) **Publicizing the procedural changes to police recruitment, to the Division, police components, and to the Police Contributing Countries.**

<sup>46</sup> All EU mission positions, for example, including both police and civilian, have a job description, are advertised openly on a public website and recruitment is all decentralized to the field except for positions related to members of the senior management team, where headquarters take an active role.

<sup>47</sup> The OPSP mandate as detailed in General Assembly Resolution 67/287 is sufficiently broad to allow the office to conduct such a review.

Figure 3: Fast-Track Selection Process for United Nations Police Officers in Field Missions

## FAST-TRACK SELECTION PROCESS FOR UNITED NATIONS POLICE OFFICERS IN FIELD MISSIONS



SOURCE: POLICE DIVISION, ADAPTED BY REVIEW TEAM, DCAF/ISSAT.

101. **The assessment process should be expanded with additional tests to assess the relevant competencies for the work of the reform stream of police components.** The current SAAT tests do not do enough to identify suitably qualified Police Development personnel, and to enhance the inclusion of women in police components. Given the importance of the SGF in creating a unified understanding of United Nations policing-related tasks, demonstrating an understanding of the SGF should certainly be part of the assessment of key positions, and potentially all candidates. This assessment process for Police Development Officers should be managed and conducted by the SPC, who should have responsibility for the implementation of the SGF.

102. **All reform stream roles should be offered as extended deployment cycles starting at two years<sup>48</sup>.** Cultural understanding, relevant language skills and proximity in policing approaches should be emphasized in relation to recruitment for certain positions in the development stream. Given that extension requests take up to three months to process, this would considerably reduce the administrative burden of selection and recruitment, minimize disruptions of UNPOL work and host country processes, and support better succession in mission through less frequent personnel changes. Performance reviews at six or 12 months would ensure that poor performers are weeded out early in their deployment.

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<sup>48</sup> The term offered implies that the preferred deployment cycle is two years, but that exceptions can be accepted, depending on availability of capacity.

103. **Police Division should increase its gender equality outreach and advocacy with major Police Contributing Countries.** In the framework of the Global Initiative, Police Division, together with UN Women, should fundraise for dedicated resources to address gender equality and women's participation in United Nations peace operations. They should continue and expand their support to national initiatives that target and prepare women for United Nations Police deployments. Police Division should place greater emphasis on appointing women to leadership positions (both in the field and in Police Division), provide additional training to facilitate women's advancement in UNPOL, use competency-based selection mechanisms, and commit to ongoing monitoring and evaluation of gender trends in UNPOL.

## **Function 4, Knowledge: Manage Knowledge, Information, Train Personnel and provide policy guidance on UN Policing-related Tasks**

104. Police Division is the UN's global hub of police knowledge management. It should provide all United Nations peace operations with the information needed to ensure continuity of effort and the implementation of good practice. The Police Division is responsible for the development and review of overall United Nations Police policy, along with the technical guidelines and standard operating procedures that enable police components within DPA and DPKO missions to operate in alignment with policy. Police Division should monitor the implementation of policy, identify good practices from the field, learn from them and share them across missions.

### **Findings on the Knowledge Function**

105. **Police Division struggles to manage and disseminate knowledge and policy as needed.** Information management and knowledge dissemination to field components, to PCCs and to the wider United Nations system is a key Police Division function and a vital means to fulfil its mandate. At present there is no information and knowledge management system managed by Police Division and focused on policing issues. The gap is causing the unnecessary re-creation of procedures, systems and guidance in each field mission, and reducing the ability of Police Division to meaningfully provide relevant information to missions. Furthermore, the fact that Police Division has not yet developed guidance to police components on such a crucial mandated task as the **Protection of Civilians**, illustrates the problem.

106. **Responsibility for information collection from missions is divided.** Both Police Division's Mission Management and Support Section (MMSS) and the police liaison officers in the Integrated Operational Team (IOT) claim the responsibility for the transmission of information to and from police components in missions. There is significant confusion in communication and information collection, with missions getting multiple versions of the same request.

107. **Police Division is overwhelmed by administrative tasks and HQ oriented requests.** Police Division is currently unable to effectively analyse key mission information, and provide the missions with continuity of knowledge. All MMSS staff are responsible for supporting more than one mission. The proliferation of administrative tasking, when combined with the number of missions covered by each individual in the MMSS team, results in a lack of time to analyse, problem solve, and provide relevant strategic advice to missions.

#### **BOX 6: REINFORCING CURRENT FIELD MISSIONS – A CORE OMA AND POLICE DIVISION TASK**

Providing strategic advice to current operations is a central part of both OMA's and Police Division's work. Both have the same number of current peacekeeping missions to cover, as well as the need to keep a watching briefing on potential future mission environments.

OMA has 22 officers to undertake this task, while Police Division currently has 13. In addition, OMA has an assessment capacity of 12 officers, which is a capacity currently lacking within the Police Division structure<sup>49</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> For the equivalent of mission management and support, the EU has a ratio of 2-3 desk officers per mission.

108. **The rationale for much of the police components reporting to headquarters is unclear.** The current set of reporting requirements seems to be unbalanced, with a focus on satisfying internal headquarters needs for information, rather than identifying field needs for support, analysis and strategic guidance. The vast extent of tactical information collected appears overly detailed and is both concealing and contributing to the lack of proper attention to strategic policing outcomes, notably the lack of any assessment of progress against police CONOPS and mandate outcomes.

109. **No section of Police Division has clear responsibility for identifying and sharing good practice.** The review team could find no evidence that Police Division was consistently collecting evidence of good practice from the field, analysing field data to identify the core components that contributed to good practice, or working to disseminate good practice lessons back to the field components. While the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET) within DPKO is tasked with good practice and knowledge generation, this is a DPKO focused process. What is needed is an internal Police Division proactive process for collecting lessons specific on policing and sharing with police component in the field.

110. **The field is not able to get clear advice from headquarters to address current issues.** As mentioned in the opening sections of this report, evolving complex threats to international security will have an influence on United Nations policing-related tasks. There is no section in Police Division that is currently enabled and tasked to conduct the necessary strategic forward thinking. There is also a need to engage with PCCs, and the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) to influence how they understand and support policing in peace operations. While the United Nations cannot and should not take on knowledge excellence role in all areas, there is an obligation to help missions access the specialized knowledge and the organizations that can provide it.

111. **The Strategic Guidance Framework has yet to be finalized or fully implemented.** The overly long policy development process has left Police Division unable to lead policy implementation in the field. The confusion in policy implementation has been increased by repeated changes to the internal lines of responsibility for the management and delivery of the SGF within Police Division. The process has now resulted in three out of the four planned strategic guidance documents, but has not yet created the body of thematic manuals that will provide detail to inform specific behaviours in the field. Without such thematic guidance, it is difficult for police components to coherently implement the strategic framework, a problem compounded by the lack of any formal oversight process accompanying the implementation process. No resourced roll-out strategy currently exists for the SGF which, given that it is a central pillar of the future United Nations approach to policing, is a significant oversight. There are signs, however, that the SGF is being taken up outside the United Nations, with the EU utilizing the framework of the SGF to structure the development of their own police operational guidance.

112. **The lack of adequate support for FPU, throughout Police Division, has resulted in a lack of policy and direction, which contributes to FPUs being currently underutilized and misused.** The Police Division is not currently empowered to ensure compliance with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Formed Police Units, as operational control of FPUs falls under the purview of mission leadership. This results in the existing guidance having limited effect. For instance, in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central Africa Republic (MINUSCA), the critical mass of FPUs have been dispersed and deployed on static guard duties<sup>50</sup>, in direct disregard for DPKO's FPU Policy. There are other indicators that FPU's are being disassembled and deployed in smaller units, which defeats the principle of unit integrity.

113. **There is a significant requirement for in-service training for United Nations police.** The slow development of UNPOL policy and guidance has resulted in an over-dependence on multiple national PCC systems, with the ensuing significant variation in the content of the pre-deployment training<sup>51</sup>. The SGF represents an effort to create a coherent UNPOL policy and guidance, but as yet a Police Division implementation plan has not been created, and the policy has not been comprehensively disseminated.

114. **The Police Division's knowledge management function is further undermined by inadequate information technology.** Basic internal management of information is fundamentally flawed, with limited shared hard drive space representing a real constraint on the archiving of documentation. Information sharing between systems is often poor, both within the headquarters and between headquarters and the field components. The lack of an adequate knowledge and information management system is leading to a waste of resources. Police Division is now starting to implement IT based systems that specifically support the management of information (notably the HERMES system for managing recruitment information, and the COSMOS system being used to enable inter-mission sharing of policy and guidance documentation).

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<sup>50</sup> 67% of the FPU strength in MINUSCA, which was under the (military) command of the Bangui Joint Taskforce, was dispersed and being used in static guard duty when the review team visited.

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<sup>51</sup> Currently 15 PCCs have been certified to deliver pre-deployment training courses, but the SGF has not been fully integrated into the pre-deployment training.

## Recommendations on the Knowledge Function

115. **The Police Division should be structured and resourced to collect, analyse, archive and disseminate lessons from UNPOL missions.** The collection process should begin with MMSS, who have the ongoing relationship with missions, and should conduct regular evaluations. Specific analysis and lesson development should be conducted by the SPC, which maintains the specialized and thematic expertise/knowledge, in collaboration with the development component of the Strategic Policy and Development Section (SPDS). For a core mandated task, such as the Protection of Civilians, the development of the necessary guidance should be of highest priority. Finally, it is a MMSS responsibility to ensure that the knowledge and guidance is disseminated across missions.

116. **The Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) should be the point of contact for routine information reporting from missions.** MMSS should be relieved of the burden of reporting and creating headquarters communications, to enable a much stronger focus on supporting and providing strategic advice to the field. They should work closely with the planning team and the IOTs to ensure continuity of knowledge. MMSS should communicate directly with police components, focus on resolving policing specific problems, identification of policing concerns that should be addressed by headquarters, and support to the continuity of mission knowledge through oversight of the evaluation of progress against the police CONOPS.

117. **Police Division should build cross-mission networks to share experiences and promising practices.** Feedback from field components, at multiple levels, indicated that inter-mission communication is currently limited, and is not systematically facilitated by headquarters. As part of knowledge management and information sharing, the development of facilitated networks between people in similar positions across missions is a function Police Division is well positioned to support.

118. **Police Division should identify a small team to monitor and analyse the trends and challenges influencing policing in peace operations.** Unlike the team supporting the SGF development and implementation, this is an analytical role designed to ensure that Police Division is aware of, and responding to, changes in the peace operations environment and expectations. It should be capable of engaging with the C34 and PCC's to develop a common understanding of the evolution of United Nations policing-related tasks, in order to ensure that Police Division has their support in responding.

119. **Finalisation and oversight of the implementation of Strategic Guidance Framework should be done urgently and it should be the responsibility of the policy team.** The SGF process should balance continued development of the higher policy level documents with the creation of more applied operational guidance and tools. The SGF needs to have a clear communications and dissemination plan. Progress on the SGF and its implementation plan should be reviewed with PCCs and the Police Components at the next Heads of Police Components meeting at the end of 2016. With the expectation that the initial series of tactical level guidance materials<sup>52</sup> be completed by June 2017. It should be referenced in the CONOPS, integrating specific guidance for the main operational activities to improve consistency in the UNPOL approach across missions. This is, admittedly, a daunting task given the enormity of the deployments and is exacerbated by frequent rotations of field staff. Unlike the development of the policy level of the SGF, the thematic manuals and field-oriented tools are internal United Nations documents and should be distributed to every officer. They should not require the same level of consultations with Members State.

<sup>52</sup> These include: i) Community-oriented policing; ii) Intelligence-led policing; iii) Integrated border management; iv) Operational planning; v) Donor coordination; and vi) Mentoring, monitoring and advising

### BOX 7: FOR POLICY TO CHANGE BEHAVIOUR IT NEEDS TO BE CONSTANTLY REINFORCED AND REQUIRES A DEDICATED TEAM TO OVERSEE ITS IMPLEMENTATION

The development of guidance, while difficult, is not the most challenging aspect of changing behaviour. Changing behaviour through a new policy or tool requires constant reinforcement, a clear roll out strategy, its integration into training, continuous monitoring and its support in the field by commanders who lead by example and set the tone. With the investment that has been made in the SGF, it is important that there is a realistic view of what it will take to influence the approach of police components, to change the behaviour of UNPOL officers and ultimately to improve impact. Two recent experiences can help to give an insight: the roll out of the SPC developed 'SMART' tool (Timor-Leste, Haiti, Liberia and CAR) to generate data on host-State capabilities, and the Swedish National Police Board support for the roll out of the new Induction Training for UNPOL officers (Liberia, Mali & South Sudan). In both cases it took a dedicated team significant time in mission, political leadership by the head of the UNPOL component and adaptation to the local context. In both cases, the roll out in a small number of missions took 3-4 years, and was further complicated by the rotation system within police components, which led to a reduction in institutional memory.

120. **In service training for UNPOL should be greatly enhanced, including training in advising and mentoring skills and on the Strategic Guidance Framework.** Given the unique needs of police components in United Nations peace operations, there is a need to better use training capacity and invest in helping bridge the gap between UNPOL officers' national experience and their role within peace operations<sup>53</sup>. It is the view of the review team that, even with significant improvements in the provision of appropriately skilled personnel, there will remain a large requirement for United Nations in-service training. The SGF, in addition to skills training, should be an integral part of pre-deployment, induction and in-service training.

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<sup>53</sup> Noting the new Senior Police Advisers course as a positive development in United Nations police training.

121. **Police Division should expand its use of information technology to support the management of knowledge across missions and within headquarters.** The use of HERMES and COSMOS are positive signs of improvements in knowledge management within Police Division, but they will only support significant changes in behaviour if they are consistently supported and implemented.

## ***Function 5, Accountability: Provide accountability and oversight for policing outcomes in peace operations.***

122. Police Division has a key role to play in overseeing UNPOL mission outcomes and their coherence with the United Nation's commitments. This function has two dimensions: one aspect is concerned with accountability to Member States and includes regular reporting and transparency to the main stakeholders, mainly PCCs and the Security Council. The second is about monitoring field missions and holding them accountable for compliance with United Nations Police policy and commitments.

### **Findings on the Accountability Function**

123. **Police Division is lacking an overall accountability framework.** There are accountability deficits on a number of levels within United Nations Police peace operations, with few processes designed to enable and support the development of a culture of accountability in headquarters, peace operations and PCCs. While the *Multi-Year Strategy of Police Division* is a programme management tool, it does not represent a comprehensive accountability framework. Police Division is not systematically ensuring compliance with United Nations Police policy and procedures, nor does it currently have the capability to identify or address weaknesses in the current system<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup> Interviews in New York and the consultation in Entebbe.

124. **There is currently no identified consistent process within Police Division to systematically monitor and evaluate the progress of police components against the CONOPS and mandate of the peace operation.** Neither the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), nor the evaluation team in DPET, have the capability or responsibility to conduct regular evaluation of police components. Police Division, internally, lacks the structure and capability to conduct regular evaluations of the police components of peace operations. Despite the existence of a DPKO/DFS policy on internal evaluations and inspections of United Nations Police (2012.13), there are no regular evaluations specifically of the police components in missions. As a result, it cannot develop a comprehensive understanding of police mission performance nor account for the adoption and use of United Nations Police policy and guidance. The lack of regular assessments makes it significantly harder for the Police Division to oversee progress against the CONOPS, and provide strategic advice to guide the missions in correctly aligning resources to achieve the required outcomes. The result is that the strategic realignment of police components, as conditions change within the mission, cannot be guided by headquarters in an informed manner, and often does not occur. Providing strategic advice to inform field missions is a core responsibility for Police Division and it is hugely problematic that the division is unable to do so in an informed manner.

125. **The Police Contributing Countries lack a specific Police committee to provide their representatives in New York with direct and informed oversight of police aspects of peace operations.** The creation of a Military Staff Committee was envisaged in the United Nations charter<sup>55</sup>, which provides the Security Council with a structure to assess and review the military component of United Nations peace operations. The lack of a police related Committee reporting to the General Assembly or the Security Council limits the formal involvement of Member States in discussions on police planning, priorities, outcomes and the further development of United Nations policing-related tasks (see recommendation on creation of the Police Advisory Committee under the Police Division Responsibilities section).

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<sup>55</sup> Established under article 47, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

126. **No United Nations internal oversight structure provides consistent monitoring and independent evaluation of the police aspects of peace operations.** The Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships has only partial responsibility for the independent oversight of police components. The OPSP does have the responsibility to conduct regular audits of military and FPU contingents across all peace operations. This remit has proved useful, as the OPSP has been able to identify several significant FPU issues, and make recommendations on how they should be resolved. The OIOS does conduct police-specific evaluations and audits, but these are not systematic and are generated as a result of specific requests. They do not comprehensively cover all peace operations on a regular basis. Within DPKO, DPET conducts thematic learning evaluations of peace operations, but as with the OIOS these are conducted and resourced ad hoc, where requested to address specific issues. This is not adequate.

127. **Police Division has a limited capability to support the enforcement of professional standards across police components.** While the new HERMES system makes an effort to track IPO performance, it currently only tracks performance for those IPOs seeking an extension, and is not systematically utilized. As such, those who may have performed badly and do not seek an extension are missed by this tracking system. Police division should ensure the submission of performance reports onto the HERMES system for all uniformed personnel prior to completion of a tour of duty.

128. **The Police Division's capability to provide adequate oversight of FPU's is similarly weak to that of its oversight of Police Components.** DFS is providing consistent and coherent oversight of FPU equipment availability and operability and exacting financial penalties to encourage PCC's to address issues. Police Division does not seem to be providing any type of similar role pertaining to policy and procedures aspects of FPU deployments<sup>56</sup>.

129. **Given the increased attention on addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), as well as the promotion of, and respect for human rights, Police Division is responding to these critical policy issues.** International human rights standards provide an important common denominator for international policing, which any PCC can be expected to uphold. Police Division could do more to proactively make the changes called for in the Human Rights up Front (HRUF) initiative<sup>57</sup>, the United Nation's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

<sup>56</sup> Policy and operational gaps in FPU were identified in the January 2008 Interim Report of the Formed Police Unit Review and Standards Team, which undertook a comprehensive appraisal of every one of the 38 FPU deployed at that time. The Police Division and DPKO, with the engagement of Member States, followed the FPU review with a thorough revision of policy and by assembling and training Mobile Training Teams. Nonetheless, some fundamental issues identified in 2008, and pertaining to gaps in accountability, still persist.

<sup>57</sup> See <http://www.un.org/sg/right-supfront/doc/RuFAP-summary-General-Assembly.shtml>

## Recommendations on the Accountability Function

130. **Police Division should create an accountability framework immediately.** This framework should establish accountability mechanisms to:

- a) Oversee and evaluate police components' efforts to achieve the goals set in the police CONOPS;
- b) Promote ethical behaviour of police deployed in United Nations peace operations;
- c) Ensure unethical behaviour by members of police components is appropriately sanctioned by PCCs;
- d) Ensure that the police in peace operations are overseen and evaluated adequately by the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council.

131. The following specific recommendations comprise components of this proposed accountability framework:

132. **The CONOPS process should become the key instrument for mission management.** The CONOPS should be developed jointly by Police Division and the field mission. It should identify the criteria against which the success of the police component and the police component leadership will be measured. While the creation of the CONOPS will depend on Police Division strategic planners, it should be owned by the mission from the earliest possible point. This should improve alignment with the field realities, and provide a greater level of accountability between headquarters and the field mission. In this regard, aligning the capacities and police presence to the needs of the host-State will be part of the strategic review assessment and the evaluation of police components.

133. **The Police Division must conduct bi-annual evaluations of police components beyond the strategic review process in relation to mandate renewal.** The purpose of these evaluations should be to account for progress against the goals identified under the mission mandate and CONOPS, and to assess the utilization and compliance with the United Nations Police policy, guidance and training. The responsibility to conduct regular evaluations of UNPOL progress against mandate implementation should be assigned to the MMSS. The responsibility to assess progress against implementation of UNPOL policy and guidance should be assigned to the policy section.

134. **As part of these regular evaluations of police components, Mission Management Support Section should be capable of reviewing and assessing the Formed Police Units.** As the 2008 review demonstrates, adequate FPU performance is only achieved when there is consistent oversight, and regular processes to support the maintaining of standards<sup>58</sup>.

135. **At the level of DPKO it would be valuable to have an independent and periodic audit of police components.** Given the role and responsibilities of the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships, their remit should be expanded to include the full police component into the audits they currently undertake for the military component and FPUs<sup>59</sup>. This is in addition to, and does not negate the need for an evaluation capacity within Police Division. The first audit should be of recruitment and global selection processes, as recommended under Function 3 on Recruitment.

136. **The Police Division should improve its ability to ensure that missions, headquarters and Police Contributing Countries are all informed of the outcomes of professional standards investigations of United Nations Police.** When criminal or professional misconduct charges are recommended, the PCC process to address this issue should be monitored and openly reported. This responsibility should sit within the Office of the Police Adviser. The performance review process should be reviewed to ensure that Heads of Police Components are given more opportunity to sanction poor performance through repatriation. Where individuals or units are repatriated for professional standard failures Police Division should use the opportunity, perhaps as part of regular C34 meetings, to openly identify which PCC's have had personnel repatriated, and provide regular formal updates where there is lack of progress in domestic investigations. Police Division should also confirm that the information is captured in HERMES, to ensure that such personnel are irrevocably and permanently excluded from United Nations police components.

137. **The role of Police Division and senior UNPOL officers in missions should be to provide the necessary leadership to foster an organizational culture of preventing abuse.** In missions, leaders should set the example, apply daily command emphasis, build a climate of accountability, ensure that, as a preventative strategy, SEA and Human Rights training takes place, and that Police Division works closely in collaboration with Conduct and Discipline. The Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, the Human Rights up Front (HRUF) initiative and the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) called for significant changes in human rights enforcement and the protection of vulnerable people against abuse. It is absolutely critical that Police Division, as other entities in the United Nations system review whether they are proactive enough in following up on the critical policies issues of SEA, HRDDP and the HRUF. Accountability to the United Nations' human rights policies and standards should be understood as a core element of the accountability framework needed by the Police Division. Full and proactive implementation of these policies should be part of the responsibility of the senior management of Police Division.

## ***Function 6, Partnerships: Building strategic police partnerships***

138. To effectively provide strategic direction and oversight of police within peace operations, the Police Division must successfully develop strong relationships with peacekeeping, political, peacebuilding, development, law enforcement, and the justice and security elements of the United Nations. It must develop strong relationships with the major development and reform actors, in order to understand and integrate its institutional reform mandates. It must build deep and durable relationships with the full range of PCC's, to better articulate the needs of United Nations Police missions, and understand the range of policing approaches and cultures that will come together to form cohesive United Nations Police components. Moreover, it needs to build enduring relationships with other significant multilateral organisations, including the EU, the AU and INTERPOL. The Police division should be part of a comprehensive, seamless and coordinated system.

<sup>58</sup> United Nations, (2008). "Interim Report of the Formed Police Unit Review and Standards Team".

<sup>59</sup> The functions of the OPSP, as decided in General Assembly Resolution 67/287, empower it to identify gaps impacting on the delivery of DPKO mandates, cover all uniformed field personnel and enable it to make recommendations on lessons learned in peacekeeping operations. As such the OPSP mandate already covers the whole police component, and would require only a change in OPSP policy.

## Findings on the Partnerships Function

139. **One of the results of the military-focus of United Nations peace operations is that the Police Division has not built sufficiently strong relationships within DPKO and the United Nations system.** Military approaches are much better understood at all levels of DPKO/DFS. Many of the problems that Police Division experiences are a result of the military frame of reference that continues to influence the United Nations' understanding of peacekeeping operations. Neither Police Division, nor the OROLSI structure, it is a component of, have successfully addressed this issue. Policing is not yet well understood throughout DPKO, let alone in the wider United Nations secretariat. Police Division has not yet successfully managed to articulate and explain the role of policing in United Nations peace operations, nor to build the right relationships throughout the United Nations system to support UNPOL.

140. **Relationships with UNDP and other development actors are at a formative stage.** Police Division has invested some effort into the Global Focal Point Arrangement (GFP) and the development world, but this will need to continue if it is to result in more effective police institution-building in the field. One constraint in this engagement is the limited development team in SPDS, which out of an authorized strength of four is currently solely composed of the gender adviser<sup>60</sup>. There are some positive signs in the relationship with UNDP, where SPC has successfully deployed to provide police advice to development efforts. However, support to the integration of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and the funding mechanisms associated with it, is not well understood and capitalized on by United Nations Police components. Little consistent effort is invested into working with donors to ensure adequate resources are available to support the needs of host-State police as part of police development efforts.

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<sup>60</sup> The development sub-team has a mandated strength of 4 personnel.

141. **Police Division has not yet built adequate partnerships with all key Security Sector Reform actors.** Systemic approaches to justice and security sector reform intended in the United Nations system are underused by United Nations Police components. Police Division is inadequately integrated with other parts of OROLSI, and the collaboration between police components, rule of law sections and SSR teams in field missions is uneven. Part of the issue is that the OROLSI construct has yet to achieve its aim of appropriately coordinating the full range of rule of law and SSR actors to support the implementation of a United Nations chain of justice development effort<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> Interviews in New York.

142. **The relationship between Police Division, the Office of Operations, and the Department of Field Support is limited.** Police Division is not adequately engaged within DPKO's Office of Operations, despite the positioning of liaison officers into the IOTs. Information distribution within the United Nations, policing specific input to planning processes, and the management of interaction with the field are all less cohesive than they should be. With DFS, there is clear will on both sides for better engagement and outcomes, but achieving these has been hampered by the limited understanding of policing within peace operations, and the limited capability of Police Division to engage and educate partners as required. Where the OMA has six officers embedded into DFS to facilitate coordination, and can count on a significant contingent of ex-service personnel in the DFS ranks, the Police Division lacks a single DFS embed.

143. **More could be done to further the partnership between the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union.** Real progress is being made on aligning policy between these key multi-lateral police assistance actors. The EU has already shown that it is committed to integrating and using the SGF, which will assist coherence of multilateral operations in the field. However, significant issues remain in practice, notably in the area of standardization of human resources, including the assessment, selection, and preparation of deploying police components. Policy coordination may also help avoid problems with re-hatting personnel, such as occurred in the Central African Republic. Greater effort needs to be made to help develop the AU approach to police deployments, including around planning through the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and engagement with the African Standby Force. This might have a significantly positive impact.

144. **The majority of Police Contributing Countries do not have Police Officers as advisers in their Missions to the United Nations.** In contrast, most Member States have Uniformed Military members present in their representations, and many nations use these officers to cover the police adviser role. This means Police Division has to work harder to effectively engage with and ensure that police issues are adequately understood and addressed. It also negatively impacts the level of technical policing expertise that Police Division can directly engage with on a regular basis.

145. **Police Division has managed to provide effective support to missions to develop basic serious and organized crime capabilities, but there are limits to the extent to which police components can support host nations in tackling such complex issues.** It is crucial that host-State police institutions are supported by the international community to consider complex crimes, including terrorism and serious and organized crime, as part of reform and institution-building efforts. However, the main task of the reform, restructuring and development pillar of United Nations Police mandates is to support the most basic host-State police functions. Efforts focused on complex crimes represent a diversion of scarce resources from the core task. The Police Division is playing a role in linking field missions facing these challenges with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and international expert resources (EU, AU, INTERPOL, Financial Action Task Force/FATF and Member States). The serious and organized crime team in Police Division appears to be one of the more successful cross-mission coordination efforts and its facilitating role will be increasingly important.

## Recommendations on the Partnerships Function

146. **Recognizing the importance of a coherent approach to rule of law within OROLSI, the review team has made a recommendation for a separate review process, under the implementation section.**

147. **Responsibility for Police Division engagement with UNDP and with the Global Focal Point Arrangement should be clearly delineated and resourced.** The lack of a resourced development team in Police Division currently leaves no internal capability to develop and build this relationship. The police development coordination effort should also explicitly include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UN Habitat, UNODC and other United Nations agencies which play roles in supporting the development of host-State police institutions.

148. **Police Division should facilitate resource mobilization for the needs of police institution development.** Police institutions cannot develop with only advice and training. Resources and material assistance are needed through separate funding streams. Quick impact funding and programmatic funding provide some limited financing opportunities for the efforts of police components. As regards financial support for police development plans of host-States, Police Division should engage systematically with resource mobilization efforts at headquarters in New York, such as through the Peacebuilding Fund, UNDP and/or the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which have experience in administering multi-donor trust funds in individual countries for police purposes. Also at the field level, Civilian Police Experts with donor coordination experience could be very helpful in assisting host-States with donor mobilization and coordination, whether bilateral or multilateral donors.

149. **The Police Division should be resourced to interact better with Department of Field Support.** Simply put, DFS has a better understanding of how to support military operations than it does police operations. This can only be resolved by Police Division investing more in the relationship.

150. **The Police Division and DPKO should explore additional ways of generating supplementary resources in Police Contributing Countries which are willing to provide, but currently lack, the means to provide a Formed Police Unit.** Member States should be urged to provide the necessary resources and training to such PCC's. Such mobilization should also build on lessons learnt from the independent review of FPU's, which is proposed in the Implementation section.

151. **Police Division should support the promulgation of the Strategic Guidance Framework to the European Union and African Union.** While this should not distract Police Division from improving how it implements the SGF, the opportunity represented by EU and AU enthusiasm for the SGF is sufficiently great that it should be seized<sup>62</sup>. The current liaison function in the UNOAU should be reinforced (back to two officers) to support, in particular, standardization issues on human resources, and a further police liaison should be placed within the United National Liaison Office on Peace and Security (UNLOPS) in Brussels (see Box 9 for more details on the potential role of a police liaison based in Brussels). Police Division should also work to support greater field integration of AU and EU missions.

<sup>62</sup> Interviews in New York and with the AU and EU representatives

**BOX 8: EUROPEAN UNION – UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION COULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED AND IN PARTICULAR ALONG FOUR LINES:**

- **Enhance EU-UN inter-operability:** the EU partnership with United Nations peace operations has developed much in the last four years, building on experiences in Mali and elsewhere. Further work regarding the inter-operability between EU policing missions operating alongside and in support of United Nations objectives should be explored;
- **Engaging more EU member states to support UNPOL deployment:** The United Nations could assign a liaison officer in Brussels to work to mobilize EU member states, as well as EU financing;
- **Sharing of good practices:** including guidance documents, and training documents to jointly develop the operational contents of the SGF. A deepening partnership to harmonize pre-deployment training would further support coordination efforts.
- **Accessing development funding:** through 'capacity building for security and development' and 'the instrument contributing to stability and peace' – could help overcome some of the financing gaps for programme/project funding in United Nations peace operations.

152. **Police contributing countries should be encouraged to appoint senior police advisers, with a policing background, to their Permanent Delegations in New York.** Their role, similar to their military adviser colleagues' work with OMA, would be to engage fully with the Police Division regarding current operations, future needs and the development of UNPOL. Several of the previous recommendations, most notably the request for the creation of a Police Advisory Committee, are highly dependent of the quality of PCC-Police Division interaction. The more PCC's invest in providing police officers as advisers, the better the quality of their influence and relationship with Police Division.

153. **Given the fact that Police Division is seriously over-stretched, and given the complexity of issues such as counter terrorism, illicit trade and serious and organized crime, there is a question of the extent to which scarce resources can be devoted to supporting their implementation in United Nations Peace Operations.** However, for missions with particular challenges in these areas, it is crucially important that Police Division at a headquarters level coordinates with UNODC and international entities (EU, AU, INTERPOL, Member States) to channel appropriate international support to host nations' police institutions tackling these challenges.

# VIII. Structure and Resourcing

## Findings on the Structure of Police Division and its Resourcing

154. **The Police Division, as we know it today, was created in 2000 following the recommendation of the Brahimi report.** Before that it was a Unit within the Office of the Military Adviser. The Brahimi report recommended the establishment of a Police Division that would focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of host-State police, in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks, while also having a capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for force protection (see A/55/305 – S/2000/809, paras 39 and 119). Police Division is currently headed by a D2 who reports to the Assistant Secretary General of OROLSI. It is composed of three sections based in New York: Mission Management and Support Section, Strategic Policy and Development Section and Selection and Recruitment Section, and also includes the Standing Police Capacity located in Brindisi. The New York- based staff constitutes 58 in total (61 authorized strength) and Brindisi-based staff is 23 in total (37 authorized strength); see Annex 4 for more details.

155. **The recommendations of the HIPPO report included a proposal for a restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat, to be considered by the next Secretary-General.** This review supports the proposals for a review of the spectrum of peace operations, better strategic analysis, planning, and evaluation, better integration of United Nations efforts, strengthened accountability, and the integration of civilian and uniformed capacities. The evidence from the review of Police Division is that these improvements are urgently required.

156. **Police Division's human and financial resources are insufficient given the scale and complexity of their tasks.** Police Division's current capacity is not delivering effective outcomes, in part due to a severe under-resourcing of key functions. Police Division resourcing has not kept up with the growing urgency and complexity of police mandates in peace operations. This under-resourcing is hindering the Police Division's ability to achieve overall United Nations objectives in post-conflict environments.

157. **The basic structure of Police Division is not the primary issue.** The key challenges are essentially managerial and resource-based. Without adequate resources, better management and adjustments of its tasks, Police Division will not be able to adequately deliver on its responsibilities. Some structural changes might still help facilitate needed synergies and reducing institutional bottlenecks so as to better serve the United Nations system and the field.

158. **The current structure does not sufficiently support the important strategic mission planning function of Police Division.** The rationale and benefits for positioning the planning function within SPDS are not clear. Moreover, this structure does not position the planning team to interact with the IOTs. The diffusion of planning responsibilities across the IOTs and SPDS is not ideal, and results in confusion regarding police planning inputs to United Nations strategic planning processes.

159. **The lack of clarity about the specific functions and tasks allocated to the Office of the Police Adviser contributes to the weak correlation between functions, teams and tasks in the Police Division structure.** This is detrimental to the overall morale and performance of the Division. For instance, while the SGF is clearly a core focus for the Police Division, it is clearly a policy development function that should be managed by SPDS.

160. **A consistent finding has highlighted that Police Division's various entities tend to operate in silos, rather than in an integrated manner.** There is much overlap between the OPA and the SRS, MMSS and SPDS sections, with very limited synergies in spite of the relatively small size of Police Division. While some relationships were functioning well, poor coordination and information-sharing between teams was mentioned repeatedly during the Police Division interviews<sup>63</sup>.

63 Interviews in New York.

161. **The Standing Police Capacity is the most field-focused element of Police Division, and is usefully separated from headquarters-centric processes.** The 2015 OIOS report (using data collected in 2013) criticized the performance of SPC for insufficient deployment of the Brindisi-based police advisers. While SPC has started addressing this issue, it is questionable whether the deployment rate is a good indicator of effective support to the field. This review has found that SPC is capably functioning in its mission start-up and ongoing mission support role, and has demonstrated its value in direct and desk support to existing police components in the field. The SPC has provided high value support to a number of police components, albeit others note that it has not yet reached its full potential.

162. **The current structure of the Standing Police Capacity is organized around the need to support the start-up of new missions, even though this is an infrequent occurrence, and its main task in reality can be seen as supporting current missions with thematic expertise.** In practice, the teams assigned to start-up a mission do not reflect the team structure in Brindisi. The current structure does not support the development of United Nations Police institutional knowledge, as it disperses specialist knowledge between teams, limiting the ability of SPC to develop a coherent and continuous body of knowledge.

163. **The primary argument made for moving the Standing Police Capacity to New York is the lack of adequate human resourcing of Police Division<sup>64</sup>.** There is little debate concerning New York's need for the functions currently fulfilled by SPC. Given that SPC is currently considered to be better aligned with the field-support function than is the majority of Police Division, it cannot be assumed that moving SPC would result in improvements. The current lack of clarity regarding the future location of SPC, whilst its positions are slowly moved to headquarters in New York, is not helpful and disrupts the work of the SPC.

64 The other main argument for the idea of relocating the SPC to New York is that it is poorly positioned for rapid deployments to missions. This argument was found to have no substance. The United Nations internal administration systems are demonstrably the primary inhibitor of the rapid response by SPC, with its location representing a minor factor if any in overall deployment time.

164. **Some of the capacity required by Police Division can be found by reorganizing the assignment of tasks.** Monitoring and evaluation and general oversight of missions should be generated primarily through the appropriate tasking of a somewhat larger MMSS. Likewise, the current development function can be resourced by restructuring the SPDS and moving some of its elements to Brindisi, where significant police reform expertise already exists. Improved alignment of functions in Brindisi may also increase the efficiency of resource utilization by SPC. Some of the SPC positions would need to be reconfigured to fit these needs. (See Preliminary Police Division Structure in Annex 3.)

165. **Selection and Recruitment Section requires an alteration of its staffing requirements.** It is currently staffed primarily with professional posts comprised of retired or seconded police officers. This is a costly and overqualified resourcing strategy to manage the administrative processes for police recruitment. The majority of tasks associated with the recruitment process do not require police experts, but could be performed by staff with backgrounds in human resource management. Furthermore, despite an increasing field involvement in recruitment processes, this approach is not sufficiently institutionalized.

166. **Police Division has not assigned sufficient staff to manage the Formed Police Units.** SRS is inadequately resourced to manage the recruitment of FPUs, as at present there are two personnel covering these tasks<sup>65</sup>. While the Police Division supports the deployment of 71 FPU's with two Police Division staff in SRS, OMA supports the deployment of 333 distinct units with 27 staff in the Force Generation Service, with a further six staff embedded into DFS. The ratio of support is 1 for 35 in Police Division, and 1 for 10 in OMA.

65 There were previously three but one person has been subsumed into the Police Adviser's front office.

167. **The current operational budget of the police division limits the ability of headquarters sections to provide informed oversight and support to field missions.** If Police Division is to provide adequate oversight of the missions it supports, and to have a grounded understanding of the mission context, it is reasonable to suggest that all mission managers should be able to visit their focus mission once per year at least.

168. **Some of the efficiency issues of Standing Police Capacity have resulted from budget practices that may have simple solutions.** The primary reason given for police components in missions not using the SPC was the cost to mission budgets from the consultant funding line. SPC mission activities could be funded instead from the mission rotation budget, as much of their deployment covers gaps in mission skill sets that arise due to rotations in UNPOL personnel.

## Recommendations on the Structure of Police Division and the use of SPC

169. **Any adjustment of the overall position of the Police Division should be made as part of the holistic modification of headquarters' peace operations structure, as recommended for consideration by the HIPPO report.**

170. **The Police Adviser position should be upgraded to an ASG level and be double hatted, reporting to the USG DPKO (as Police Adviser) and the ASG OROLSI (as Director of Police Division).** See detailed recommendation under 'Leadership Function'. (Budget implication - one D2 upgraded to ASG.)

171. **The New York-based Police Division element should be the lead for all functions that are primarily aimed at providing strategic and technical advice on policing to the United Nations leadership and police components, including engagement with Member States, and the planning for and management of Missions.**

172. **The Office of the Police Adviser should retain only the budgeted positions currently assigned to it in the current organizational structure.** This includes the Deputy Police Adviser. The sole advisory function maintained within the OPA should be the Legal Adviser. All other functions of the Police Division should be dispersed to the team structure and made available for field-related support activities. (Budget Implication - none.)

173. **The Deputy Police Adviser should be assigned the lead for Formed Police Unit coordination, and all sections should have experienced staff to support their roles with the FPUs. The Deputy Police Adviser should also be the focal lead for gender mainstreaming.** The FPU capability needs stronger leadership and oversight, even as the support to the FPUs must be dispersed amongst all the teams that make up Police Division. Likewise, the continued process of mainstreaming gender in United Nations Police requires clear support from senior management. (Budget Implication - none.)

174. **The New York-based Police Division structure should support the following functions** (see further Annex 4 for a summary of the Preliminary Staffing Implications, pending a job-task analysis):

a) **A strengthened Mission Support function.** MMSS should be strengthened by incorporating the 5 current police liaison officers to the IOT into its numbers, plus adding 3 positions to ensure adequate coverage of current missions. The liaison role to the IOT should become a function of MMSS, in close coordination with the planning team. (21 posts: Budget Implication - 3 new posts.)

b) **The Planning function.** Creating and empowering a strategic planning team, with more personnel, would simplify Police Division engagement with several key internal partners, notably OMA, DFS, and the Office of Operations. It would be closely aligned with MMSS in liaison to the IOT's, to support full integration of policing perspectives into peace operation planning processes. This should assist Police Division to effectively contribute to the required strategic planning processes, and continue to provide the necessary support to the development of mission CONOPS. (14 posts: Budget Implication - 7 new posts.)

c) **The Selection and Recruitment function.** This should focus on bringing in civilian professionals with human resources experience to manage the recruitment process. Contemporary methods of technical talent acquisition should be inculcated into the system. The proposed decentralization of the recruitment process will relieve SRS from some of the recruitment burden. (18 posts, Budget Implication: 2 new posts, however savings can be achieved by reallocating some of the current P posts into G posts with human resources experience.)

d) **Strategic analysis and engagement with headquarters and DPKO wide policy processes.** This team would focus on the analysis of United Nations Police trends and challenges, and ensure that Police Division was fully engaged with headquarters-based policy processes. The majority of policy and development sections, however, should be field-focused, and thus transferred to Brindisi. (6 posts remain in New York: Budget implication - cost savings from post-adjustment and office space cost decreases for the transfer of 8 posts to Brindisi.)

**In total this report recommends a net increase of 5 new positions based in New York.**

175. **Police Division should be resourced to undertake mission familiarization and evaluation to support police components in the field:** The operational travel budget for Police Division should provide for MMSS desk officers to visit each peace operation at least once a year, in order to effectively oversee implementation of the CONOPS. It is the calculation of the review team that a minimum of a four-fold increase in the current travel budget is required for Police Division to effectively support field operations. (Budget implication: increase/double the travel budget for this function.)

176. **The Standing Police Capacity should remain in Brindisi, but be restructured to better integrate support to the development stream of UNPOL.** The review team found no strong operational reasons in favour of moving the SPC to New York. On the contrary, the review team found that such a move would likely result in a decreased focus on Police Division support to the police components in the field, and it would have significant post-adjustment and office space-related cost implications, reducing rather than enhancing the resources available for Police Division operations and essential field support. (Budget Implications: none.)

177. **The Brindisi-based Police Division element should be the lead for all functions that are primarily aimed at supporting knowledge and capacity in the field.** As a result, it should be restructured to support the following functions (see further Annex 4 for a summary of the Preliminary Staffing Implications, pending a job-task analysis):

a) **Mission start up/ Operational support** – this team should be structured around key management positions (P positions) within police components, required for mission start-up and critical positions that need to be filled (short-term) in case of capacity gaps. (15 posts: Budget Implication: no new posts.)

b) **Specialized Support** – this function represents a separation of the more specialized skills currently spread out across the SPC teams into a thematically grouped section. The creation of a single team will organizationally align thematic experts (e.g. Police Reform, Public Order Management, Human Resources, Information Communications Technology, Community Policing, etc.), strengthening their ability to directly support field missions on those issues. (12 posts, including development team posts transferred from New York: Budget implication, no new posts plus cost savings from post-adjustment and office space cost decreases for the transfer of 8 posts from New York.)

c) **Knowledge Management** – this function should be organized around supporting knowledge and information management capacity, especially as regards specialized policing skills. SPC is best positioned to support the gathering, analysis, archiving and dissemination of good practice and the facilitation of networks between missions. Assigning the lessons identified to SPC aligns with their role to work closely with the police components to train and improve the implementation of good practice. (8 posts re-designated from current SPC: Budget implication, no new posts)

d) **Policy and Guidance** – Brindisi and the SPC should become the centre of excellence for UNPOL guidance and the SGF. To support the translation of the SGF into field-focused and operationally relevant guidance the policy development functions of SPDS should move to Brindisi and become part of the SPC. This team should be tasked with the main role of the dissemination and implementation of the SGF at the mission level. (8 posts, 2 re-designated from SPC: Budget implication, 6 new posts);

e) **Training** – to support the required in-service training. (Budget implication - 4 posts).

178. **While acknowledging the zero growth commitment in relation to new posts in New York, the core review team has found that Police Division is so under-resourced in several areas that the Division is not in a position to deliver on key functions.** To remedy this, but also to keep cost increases to a minimum, this report recommends a net increase of only five new positions in New York and of 11 positions based in Brindisi.

179. In addition, assignment of the majority of these posts to Brindisi entails a more cost-effective approach based on post-adjustment and savings in office space-costs. Implementing these changes would also require a job task analysis of the requirements of the reorganized functions and attendant leadership.

180. **Police Division should work more closely with the African Union and the European Union, as mentioned earlier in this report** (see Function 6. Partnerships); UNLOPS in Brussels should have a new police liaison officer, and another police liaison officer should be added (revert to two posts) in the UNOAU. (3 posts: Budget implication - 2 new posts.)

181. **Integrated into the above capacity increases are up to 6 additional posts dealing specifically with Formed Police Units, divided amongst the new Planning team, MMSS and the Policy team.**

182. **Police Division should work with the Department of Field Support to enable funding of the Standing Police Capacity deployment costs to be taken from the mission budgets related to UNPOL rotation.** Working with DFS/Finance, Police Division should communicate to all peace operations the decision that the deployment of SPC personnel can be covered under the available 'IPO deployment' budget line. This would greatly facilitate SPC type deployments by Police Division, and would mitigate the impression that such deployments impose a burden on mission budgets.

183. **The overall cost implications of the reforms and restructuring arrangements proposed above would imply significant savings.** The new deployment and recruitment model is likely to imply reduced numbers of deployed police to field missions, if not at the very beginning, most certainly through the life span of the mission. The moderate increase in staff proposed in Police Division would therefore be very limited in comparison to the possible cost reduction. Recognizing that it would be difficult to calculate these cost savings in a credible way in this review process, it is recommended that such estimates be done on the basis of the implementation plan (see recommendations in Implementation section).

# IX. Implementation

184. **In accordance with the review's Terms of Reference, its recommendations will feed into the 2016 Secretary-General's report on United Nations Police** which is due to be presented to Member States at the General Assembly's 71st Session. As such, it represents an initial phase of the implementation of both Security Council Resolution 2185 (2014) and the police-specific recommendations of the HIPPO report. The set of recommendations described in this review are intended to identify a clear way forward for Police Division and consequently, inform the strategic direction of United Nations Police.

185. **Many of the recommendations in the main body of this report are within the Secretary-General's prerogative and if agreed, should be implemented over the next 12-24 months.** We urge the Secretary-General to approve them and ensure that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Police Division take appropriate action as soon as possible. At the same time, some recommendations are more far-reaching and will imply decisions by the General Assembly's legislative bodies. Given the timing of the release of this report, and the expected timing of Member States' deliberation on the 2016 Secretary-General's report on United Nations Police, it is recommended that these proposals be considered by the new Secretary-General and his/her team. For this end, the review team has consolidated the more far-reaching recommendations in a 'reform package' below.

186. The best guarantee for the implementation of these recommendations, once agreed, both in the short and the longer term, is a Department of Peacekeeping Operations and a Police Division that are fully accountable for taking this forward, in addition to a Secretary General that is seized with the issue ensuring that this remains a priority.

## For the Secretary General's consideration

### *IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP*

187. **The following recommendations are proposed for immediate follow-up and consideration by the Secretary General:**

- Given the forthcoming transition in the United Nations leadership, appoint a senior official with knowledge of the United Nations system to translate the recommendations into concrete courses of action on the issues that are within the Secretary-General's authority and oversee their implementation. The senior official should report to the Under-Secretary General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. At the same time, working directly with the Chief of Staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, the senior official would prepare for the more far-reaching reforms for Member States' consideration. Funding for the post should be sought from extra-budgetary voluntary resources.
- The senior official should work with the Police Division and DPKO to develop an implementation plan for the recommendations, if agreed. He/she should make arrangements for regular progress reporting to the Under Secretary General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and to Member States. It is foreseen that the full spectrum of changes envisaged in this report will necessitate a tenure of 18 to 24 months.
- Subject to agreement, ensure that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Police Division take the following immediate steps:
  - Support the senior official in his/her responsibilities including undertaking a job task analysis based on the preliminary proposed structure and staffing table (see Annexes 3 and 4) and

savings expected from the re-classification of posts from Professional to General Staff within the Selection and Recruitment Section.

- Ensure that the centrality of the United Nations police and the Police Division's role is considered in mission planning and operations and that the Police Adviser has a say in consultations related to evolving crises relevant to policing.
- Revise upcoming mission planning, strategic reviews, and upcoming mandate renewals in accordance with the approach proposed in this report, until further reforms in selection and recruitment have been approved and implemented.
- Ensure the Strategic Guidance Framework goes through a final fast-track completion and roll-out.
- Integrate immediately the Police Liaison Officers, now located in the Integrated Operations Teams, into the Mission Management and Support Section.
- Confirm the location of the Standing Police Capacity as Brindisi.

## *PREPARE THE REFORM PACKAGE*

188. **Request the following reform package to be positively considered by the next Secretary-General and his/her senior managers in the 2016 Secretary-General's report on United Nations Police.**

189. Propose that the senior official remains in transition to prepare the reform package, on the basis of the above preparatory work, for Member States' consideration. It is recommended that the reform package includes the following:

- Propose that the post of Police Adviser be upgraded to Assistant Secretary General.
- Propose a new police recruitment and deployment system to field missions, as recommended in this report, based on two streams, protection and development, with (i) Police Protection Officers and Formed Police Units on the one hand and (ii) Police Development Officers and Development Teams and Civilian Experts, on the other. Capitalize on the savings from reduced numbers in police deployments to enable a moderate increase in the Police Division budgeted authorized strength.
- Support Police Contributing Countries to build specialist capacities within their police services and among civilian experts over the coming 3-5 years, including through twinning arrangements with other Police Contributing Countries.
- Propose the changes recommended by this report and related to the functions, structure and capacity in United Nations Police Division, including decentralization, a field and results-based shift and moving field-oriented functions to Brindisi (thematic capacity, roll-out of the Strategic Guidance Framework, field-oriented training, and knowledge management).
- Take initiatives to improve the transparency and integrity of the deployment and recruitment system, including using the mandate of the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships to review systematic issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations, with the first priority being to review the recruitment and selection system of United Nations Police. These could include prevention of conflict of interest through dividing up responsibilities for selection and recruitment in the Police Division. Although the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships' reports are internal, this report should exceptionally be made public.
- Calculate the estimated savings from a reduction in numbers of police as a result of the new deployment and recruitment approach by 1 April 2017 and propose the moderate adjustment in the budget required to enable the Police Division to cater for its expanded role and mandate, including the conduction of appropriate oversight of police field components.

- Direct the senior official overseeing the reform package implementation plan, once agreed by Member States, to brief, together with the Police Adviser, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) and the Security Council Working group on a quarterly basis.
- Commission a comprehensive, in-depth and independent review of Formed Police Units. The review should be mandated to analyse under which circumstances Formed Police Units are fit for purpose and should be deployed, the impact of their role within missions, application of the Formed Police Units policy in practice, compliance with standard policy and procedures, as well as challenges around their flexibility, mobility, rapid deployment and equipment. The review should also analyse different options available for the provision of United Nations owned Equipment or Contingent Owned Equipment through private sector contracts.

## **Recommendations for Member States' consideration:**

### **190. For the Security Council**

- Implement sequenced and prioritized mandates, as agreed by the Security Council according to Presidential Statement S/PRST/2015/22, providing the basis for context-specific and tailor-made mandates in the policing area, preferably refraining from mandating numbers of police officers to be deployed at the outset without an in-depth assessment.
- Review the mandating approach to United Nations Police, considering a procedure which caters for more flexibility, to mandate strength and capacities in relation to the protection and development streams separately.
- Devote a separate session of the Security Council Working Group on peacekeeping to follow-up of this review and its recommendations before the summer recess.
- Request regular follow-up briefings from DPKO, Police Division and the recommended reform senior official on implementation progress of the reform package, should they be approved.
- Request that the Police Adviser briefs the Security Council in relation to police issues, and when appropriate include participation from the field.

### **191. For the General Assembly and its legislative bodies:**

- Support the concept of the centrality of policing to peace, stability and development through upgrading the Police Adviser to Assistant Secretary General.
- Support changing the current deployment model to a new police recruitment and deployment system, based on two streams, protection and reform, with (i) Police Protection Officers and Formed Police Units on the one hand and (ii) Police Development Officers and Development Teams and Civilian Experts, on the other. Support the cost savings foreseen as a result of the change in the system, and acknowledge the estimated possible savings.
- Support the changes in functions, structure and capacity in Police Division reflected in this report; including moving thematic capacity, roll-out of the Strategic Guidance Framework, field-oriented training, and knowledge management to Brindisi.
- Support the Secretary General's funding proposal for Special Political Missions to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in 2011, allowing predictable funding for police support to host-States of Special Political Missions, and the backstopping needed.
- Support the moderate increase in the budget required to enable the Police Division to cater for its expanded role and mandate and conduct appropriate oversight of the police components, through a net increase of 5 new positions in New York and 11 in Brindisi.

## **OTHER FOLLOW UP ACTIONS, IDENTIFIED AS PART OF THIS PROCESS BUT BEYOND THE REMIT OF THIS CORE REVIEW TEAM:**

192. There are critical issues impacting on the possibilities of United Nations Police to deliver on their mandates that are beyond the remit of this review. As reflected in this report, the ability of host-State police to function is dependent on the capacity in the criminal justice chain, corrections, as well as the approach to other public security providers and security sector reform. Police development efforts may fail if such support is not provided and coordinated. Furthermore, there are issues related to host-States' capacities which also should be addressed in the context of peacekeeping deployments.


193. As these issues are not within the Terms Reference for this review, the core review team recommends that these be addressed by DPKO separately. Three issues warrant careful consideration:

- **A separate review process, focusing on optimizing the capacity, coordination and delivery of Rule of Law- and security sector reform for police outcomes.** It is recommended that such a process takes into consideration the overall OROLSI-structure, functionality and coherence/coordination between its sections/units. This should include reviewing the Global Focal Point on the Rule of Law. A stronger and more effective field-oriented support to field operations is critical for Rule of Law and SSR to deliver better in support of host-States' reform processes and a critical test in this regard.
- **A stronger set of tools fostering coherence and quality across the various Rule of Law and security sector actors at the field level is required.** A simplified set of Rule of Law-indicators could enable the various components in the criminal justice chain and the security sector to be more results-oriented and monitor performance against certain key parameters, with the reform, restructuring, and development of relevant institutions towards a level which can enable missions to exit a country.
- **Given the shortage of police capacity in host-States' police services, an adjustment in police deployment policies should be considered.** Given the capacity constraints, the review team questions the appropriateness of a practice allowing uniformed services from countries hosting peace operations to participate as contributing countries in other missions. This question is not only relevant for police officers and FPUs, but also for the military deployments, and hence beyond the remit of this review. It is the view of this review team that DPKO should consider this issue, and analyse the pros and cons of such an approach carefully. The review team is of the view that those hosting peace operations should not be contributors in other missions.


# Annexes

Annex 1: United Nations Police Roles in Reform, Restructuring and Development

## UNITED NATIONS POLICE ROLES IN REFORM, RESTRUCTURING AND DEVELOPMENT




# 349 DAYS AVERAGE TIME FOR HEADQUARTERS RECRUITMENT



SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS POLICE DIVISION

## PRELIMINARY POLICE DIVISION STRUCTURE



SOURCE: REVIEW TEAM

Current		Proposed		
Section / Unit	Authorised Strength	Section / Unit	Proposed Strength	
Office of the Police Adviser	11	Office of the Police Adviser	7	Policy Officer position moved, and temporary assigned positions reassigned (current numbers in POLAD's office are higher than authorised strength)
Integrated Operations Teams	5		0	Moved to MMSS which maintains the IOT liaison function
Mission Management and Support Section	13	Mission Management and Support	21	+3 post after inclusion of IOT Police Liaison officers to enable strategic guidance role, full coverage of missions, and support to FPU's
Selection and Recruitment Section	16	Selection and Recruitment	18	+2, however with a number of P posts become G Human Resources positions. Should be cost neutral or reduce costs as a result.
Strategic Police and Development Section	16	Strategic Planning	14	Increase of 7 planning post (to add to current 7 planning posts). Reallocation of remaining (9) positions between Analysis Unit and Brindisi.
		Analysis Unit	6	+4 new positions, 1 position re-allocated from current SPDS, and 1 from OPA, to cover New York based policy processes.
<b>New York</b>	<b>61</b>		<b>66</b>	
SPC	37	SPC – Mission Start Up and Operational Support	15	-5 positions. SPC overall is reduced from current 37 to 32, but requires some re-categorising of posts. The 16 posts include the 'Chief SPC and Development'.
		SPC - Specialised Support	12	As above
		SPC - Training	4	+4 new positions, PD current has no training positions to support capacity development/in-service training
		Policy and Guidance	8	Positions re-allocated from current SPDS, move from New York to Brindisi should lead to a reduction in costs due to post adjustment and office space savings
		Knowledge Management	8	+8 positions, this is a new critical function
<b>Brindisi total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>Brindisi total</b>	<b>48</b>	
		UNLOPS-liaison officer	1 <sup>66</sup>	+ 1 new post, to reinforce EU partnership, increase access to funding and standardisation of EU/UN practices and policy
Addis	1	UNOAU-liaison officer	2	+ 1 new to help with standardisation of AU practices and policy
<b>Police Division Total</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>PD Total</b>	<b>117</b>	

## NOTE:

Implementing these changes would also require a job task analysis of the requirements of the reorganised functions.

<sup>66</sup> These liaison posts could be under Police Division budget, or more likely could be a national secondment.

Acknowledging the zero growth commitment in relation to new posts in New York, the core review team has found that Police Division is so under-resourced in several areas that the Division is not in a position to deliver on key functions. To remedy this but also to keep cost increases to a minimum, this report recommends a net increase of only 5 new positions in New York and of 11 positions based in Brindisi.

In addition, assignment of the majority of these posts to Brindisi entails a more cost effective approach based on post adjustment and savings in office space costs.

